

The Department of State

bulletin





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Essential Elements of Lasting Peace

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN¹

We are here to dedicate this beautiful park to the memory of the dead of two World Wars.

The brave men who lost their lives in those wars would approve of the way you have chosen to honor them. This park will be a place of rest and recreation. It is fitting that a war memorial should be something that can be used and enjoyed by the people. Nothing could be more appropriate than to devote a war memorial to those values of human life which our soldiers died to preserve—the values of freedom and peace.

We are not a militaristic country. We do not glorify the military way of life. Some nations have taken greater pride in their military victories than in any other national achievements, but it has never been so with us. When we think of war, it is with a prayer that the sacrifices our dead have made will never have to be repeated.

After every war we have solemnly resolved to prevent future wars. We have learned, however, that it is not enough to make resolutions. It is not enough to utter them in speeches or to engrave them on monuments. We have learned that we must devote the best efforts of our whole nation to make those resolutions come true.

We entered the first World War to restore peace and to preserve human freedom; but when that war was finished, we turned aside from the task we had begun. We turned our backs upon the League of Nations—the international organization which was established to maintain peace. We ignored the economic problems of the world, and adopted a tariff policy which only made them worse. We let our domestic affairs fall into the hands of selfish interests.

We failed to join with others to take the steps which might have prevented a second world war.

This time we are fully aware of the mistakes that were made in the past. We are on guard against the indifference and isolationism which can only lead to the tragedy of war. This time we will not let our decisions be made for us by a little group of men who are concerned only with their own special interests.

This time we have taken vigorous and far-seeing measures to preserve peace and restore prosperity throughout the world. We have assumed the responsibility that I believe God intended this great republic to assume after the first World War. We have shouldered the enormous responsibilities that go with our tremendous strength.

We have been fortunate in having many public

servants of ability and vision who have devoted themselves to the problems of foreign affairs and national defense. We have able leaders in the Congress, who have mastered the complex details of our relations with other nations. They have made themselves familiar with the effects of our policies in all parts of the globe. They have labored painstakingly to enact a body of legislation to carry out the responsibilities we have assumed.

Most significant of all, the people of this country understand the supreme importance of our foreign policy and the great objectives toward which we are moving. Public debate has threshed out the basic questions of our foreign policy. The people have made up their minds. They have supported, and will continue to support, the measures necessary to maintain peace.

We have had to work for peace in the face of troubled conditions and against Communist pressures. But because we have been united in our determination to use our strength and our substance, we have already turned the tide in favor of freedom and peace. The disintegration of the democracies of Europe has been halted. Free peoples in many parts of the world have been given new hope and new confidence. The restoration of a system of world trade has begun. And all this has been accomplished without closing the door to peaceful negotiation of the differences between the free nations and the Soviet Union.

But we are only midway in carrying out our policy. We have a long way to go before we can make the free world secure against the social and political evils on which Communism thrives. The cause of peace and freedom is still threatened.

Yet there are some who have grown weary of the effort we are making. There are voices which claim that because our policy has been successful so far, we can now afford to relax. There are some who want to slash the aid we are giving to the economic recovery of other nations; there are some who want to reject the measures that are necessary for defense against aggression; there are some who wish to abandon our efforts toward the revival of world trade. These are the same voices that misled us in the 1920's. They are misguided by short-run considerations. They refuse to face the plain facts. They try to convince us that we cannot afford to pay the price of peace.

¹ Delivered in Little Rock, Ark., on June 11, 1949, and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

But the people of the United States will not be misled a second time. We know that the short-sighted course, the easy way, is not the path to peace. The path is difficult and requires firm determination and steadfast effort.

We know that if we are to build a lasting peace in the world we must achieve three essential conditions.

First, this nation must be strong and prosperous.

Second, other nations devoted to the cause of peace and freedom must also be strong and prosperous.

Third, there must be an international structure capable of adjusting international differences and maintaining peace.

The first condition is our own strength and prosperity.

It is unusual for this nation to maintain substantial armed forces in time of peace. Yet, so long as there is a threat to the principles of peace—the principles on which the United Nations is founded—we must maintain strong armed forces. Any uncertainty as to the ability or the willingness of the free nations of the world to defend themselves is an invitation to aggression. We have seen the truth of this statement in the outbreak of two World Wars.

Our national strength is not, however, simply a matter of weapons and trained men. Even more important are our economic growth and continued prosperity.

peace. The task is difficult and requires firm de-

Our economy is the center of a world economy. The hope of economic revival throughout the world depends in large measure upon the prosperity of the United States. If our production and purchasing power are badly impaired, if the buying and selling and investing that we do in other parts of the world are cut off, other nations will be plunged into chaos and despair.

It is a prime belief of the Communist philosophy that our kind of economy is doomed to failure. The Communists predict that our prosperity will collapse—bringing the rest of the free world down with it. But they are wrong—wrong as they can be.

We know more today about keeping our economy strong than we have ever known before. We know how to strengthen our economy through the expansion of production and purchasing power and the improvement of standards of living. We understand that constantly rising national output, increasing real wages, and a fair income for farmers are basic elements of our economic strength.

To maintain these elements of prosperity, it is not sufficient to drift with the tide. We must take advantage of the new opportunities, the increased demands which result from the natural growth of our population. We must develop our natural resources and restore those we have depleted or wasted. We must establish a fair distribution of business opportunity; we must have

a free labor movement able to hold its own at the bargaining table; we must protect the purchasing power of Americans against the hazards and misfortunes of life.

These steps are necessary if we are to continue strong and prosperous. That is why our domestic programs for the development of resources, for protection against economic hazards, for the improvement of social conditions, are fundamental to our national effort for peace.

The second condition essential to peace is that other nations, as well as our own, must be strong and prosperous.

We need other nations as our allies in the cause of human freedom. We have seen free nations lost to the democratic way of life because of economic disaster. We know that despair over economic conditions will turn men away from freedom and into the hands of dictators.

It is to our interest, therefore, to aid other nations to restore and maintain their economic health. Our aim is not only to help other nations to help themselves, but also to encourage economic cooperation among them.

We have taken the lead in cooperating with other nations to restore a mutually beneficial system of world trade. No nation today can achieve prosperity in isolation. Only through participation in the trade of the world can a country raise its own standards of living and contribute to the welfare of other nations.

For years before the war, world trade was crippled by high tariffs, import quotas, exchange manipulation, and other artificial devices for securing commercial advantage. These practices were a symptom of international anarchy. They resulted, ultimately, in idle ships, idle men, and economic chaos.

We have come a long way toward correcting these evils. Since 1934, we have worked out a multitude of agreements with other countries to reduce specific tariff barriers. In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1948, we struck a world-wide blow at these obstacles to trade.

But this work is not yet finished. If we are to succeed it is vital that the authority to negotiate reciprocal-trade agreements be extended. We should then go on to establish a permanent international trade organization to apply standards of fair dealing in the commerce among nations.

The same cooperative principle has been applied in our great undertaking to restore the economies of the Western European nations to a self-sustaining basis. The food, fuel, and equipment which we have sent to Europe have been matched by the efforts which these nations have made to restore their own economies and to cooperate with one another in increasing their production and raising their standards of living.

It is fair to say that the European Recovery Program has halted the social and economic disintegration which threatened the countries of Western Europe with Communism and civil strife.

Nevertheless, the European Recovery Program is still in its early stages. At the outset it was estimated that it would take four years before these countries could again become independent of special economic aid. Only a little more than one year has passed since we began.

If we were to falter now and cut down our aid, the momentum of recovery would be destroyed. The people of these countries would be thrown into confusion, and their advance toward economic self-reliance would be blocked. A slash in the funds available for European recovery at this time would be the worst kind of false economy. It would cancel the hopes and the plans of the Western European nations. It would be a great gain for Communism.

I am confident we shall not make this mistake.

Our concern with the economic health of the world also extends to its underdeveloped regions. The prospects for peace will be immeasurably brighter if we can offer a future of hope and a better life to the people of these regions. In these areas there are millions who for centuries have known nothing but exploitation and poverty, and whose economic life is still primitive.

I have offered a program for bringing these people the benefits of our modern civilization. It is not a program of relief. While it is intended ultimately to bring about a great movement of capital through the channels of private investment for the development of these poverty-stricken regions, it is not a program of imperialism. The development of these areas offers enormous potential benefits to a growing world economy.

We have to lay the foundations for this program with care. I expect shortly to send to the Congress recommendations for initial legislation. This will be but the first step of many that we shall take, over the years to come, in this cooperative effort to better the living standards and to unlock the human skills and the natural resources of the underdeveloped parts of the globe.

The third condition essential for peace is an international structure capable of suppressing international violence. However well conceived our economic programs may be, they cannot succeed unless there is some assurance against the outbreak of aggression. Neither our own prosperity nor the prosperity of other nations can survive unless we can protect the operations of economic life from the threat of war.

Such protection depends on two factors. First, there must be constant efforts by all nations to adjust their differences peacefully. Second, there must be an agreement among nations to employ overwhelming force against armed aggression.

The United Nations is a valuable instrument for accomplishing these ends. It has already achieved the peaceful settlement of difficult issues. It has stopped hostilities in the Near East and in Indonesia. It has done a great deal to explore and find solutions for many of the economic and social problems which afflict the world.

Much remains to be done, however, to carry out the principles of the United Nations. Within the terms of the United Nations Charter, we and certain other countries have undertaken to provide greater assurance against the danger of armed conflict. That is the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. The idea behind this treaty—the association of democratic nations for mutual defense—is well understood in this country. Perhaps we do not understand, however, the importance of this pact in the eyes of the other democratic nations which are parties to it. They have been greatly weakened by the war. They have been haunted by the fear of again becoming the scene of conflict. By assuring them of our support the pact goes a long way to dispel their fears.

I have been greatly heartened by the unanimous report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate this past week in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty. I believe that it will soon be passed by an overwhelming majority in the Senate. The effect of this action will be immediate and far-reaching in allaying the fears which have retarded economic recovery in Europe.

It is of vital importance that the Atlantic pact be followed by a program of military aid to increase the effective strength of the free nations against aggression. This military assistance program—based upon mutual help—will give additional confidence to the people of those nations as they continue to rebuild their economies.

These measures will bring a stability to the democratic nations of Europe, which has not existed since the end of the war. They will at the same time contribute directly to the security of the United States.

I have discussed the three essential elements of lasting peace—a strong and prosperous United States; a strong and prosperous community of free nations; an international organization capable of preventing aggression.

We have given greatly of our effort and our strength to build a firm and enduring foreign policy upon these essentials. The burdens we have had to assume in this enterprise have been unusual. The size of the national budget shows that we are engaged in an undertaking without parallel in the history of our country or of the world.

But the goal we seek is a great one, and worth the price. Never has a nation had the opportunity which we have today to do so much for the peace and prosperity of mankind. Never has a nation had a better chance of reaching this high goal.

We must not falter now.

We must not defeat our own efforts by doing only half the job that lies before us.

The brave men, whose memory we honor here, did all that was required of them. They did not fail us. We must not fail them in our efforts to reach the goal for which they died.

We must press on in the confidence that we will succeed in the mission a divine Providence has assigned to us.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

U.S.-U.N. Cooperation in Point-4 Program

STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY WEBB

[Released to the press June 8]

The plan announced by Secretary-General Lie for an expanded program of technical assistance for economic development to be carried out through the United Nations and specialized agencies was prepared in response to a resolution introduced by the United States at the eighth meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council at Lake Success, in February of this year.¹ It will be discussed at the Ninth Meeting of the UN-Ecosoc, which will convene in July at Geneva, and its various parts will also be considered by the various specialized agencies who participated in preparing it.

It is the intention of this government to co-operate wholeheartedly with the United Nations in this program. As President Truman pointed out in his inaugural address, "This should be a co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable." We hope that other governments will also participate extensively in this program, as they do in the other activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The appropriations requested from Congress to carry out the Point-4 Program will include funds for United States participation in the technical assistance activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is anticipated that there will be a substantial need for additional technical cooperation activities, carried out on a bilateral basis, to supplement the many activities to be carried out through the United Nations and other international organizations.

WORLD RESPONSE TO THE POINT-4 PROGRAM

Interview with Assistant Secretary Thorp over the Voice of America²

MR. QUEEN [Economic Commentator]: Good evening. In the next few days, the American Congress will be asked to approve legislation providing technical assistance and fostering capital investment for the less developed areas of the world.

Here is what you might call the first concrete, global application of what President Truman meant when he said last January 20th: "Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food,

more clothing, more materials for housing, and more technical power to lighten their burdens."

In a sense, this idea of a first program is misleading. In one area, Latin America, this country has over the past decade exchanged its skills and knowledge with 20 other nations—teaching farmers how to grow different and more foods, wiping out century-old diseases, bringing new tools and techniques to our neighbors to the south and showing their peoples how to use them.

The idea of a program is misleading in a deeper sense. For this is not a single plan or even a series of plans. What we are seeing here is the emergence of a policy that will extend to virtually every aspect of American foreign relations—with people as much as countries. It is a recognition of the fact that where the threat of oppression, ignorance, hunger, and despair grip any segment of the free world, they menace the welfare and liberties of everyone, everywhere—this nation included.

What is developing in Washington, therefore, is not simply one program with a beginning and an end but a basic and major element of American foreign policy. Although some parts of it will produce results relatively quickly, its operation will extend over many decades and in many ways.

There are two other points to note about this policy and program. First, it is cooperative. The United States is joining with other countries and the United Nations to bring into play the full use of all skills of all countries.

The second point is that the program will be called into action only by the choice and willingness of the nations desiring such help. This assistance, moreover, whether in the form of technical aid or measures to encourage capital investment cannot be effective unless it is based on and supported by the resources, funds and determination on the part of the countries and the peoples themselves.

As experts in Washington see it, here lie the possibilities for the greatest advances in world health and security. Any attempt to measure

¹ *Technical Assistance for Economic Development: Plan for an expanded co-operative programme through the United Nations and the specialized agencies.* [U. N. doc. 1327/Add. 1, May 1949] viii, 329 pp. Printed. \$2.50. For text of resolutions relating to economic development, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 360.

² Given over the Voice of America short-wave system on June 9, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

these in terms of money expenditures is short-sighted and incorrect. How do you measure the elimination of cholera, typhus, or bubonic plague for hundreds of thousands of humans, who, on the average, have never lived beyond the age of thirty? A small group of men will instruct some hundreds of others on methods of improving crop production by 20 or 30 or 50 percent. These hundreds, in turn, pass on their knowledge to thousands. A pilot plant, small in cost and operation, shows manufacturers new uses for local resources. How do you estimate, in money, the ultimate value of these operations?

We are fortunate in having with us today in the Voice of America studios in Washington, the man responsible for developing this new concept in American foreign policy—Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Mr. Thorp, what has been the response thus far to President Truman's program?

MR. THORP: I should start by saying that not only since the President's speech but for the past 4 years, I have had callers from countries in all parts of the world telling me about their hopes and needs in the field of economic development. These haven't been merely the point of view of some government officials. They usually represent the needs and aspirations of the people themselves back in the home country who are demanding that their governments find ways and means of bringing economic betterment to their lives. Of course, since the President's speech, these requests to the American Government have multiplied considerably. Almost every week we get new messages from our embassies from countries asking for information and proposing specific projects for development. Last week the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced a proposed program of world-wide technical assistance to be carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies and to cost 36 million dollars in 1950 and 50 million dollars in 1951. There has never been any question of the interest of other countries in this program. The greatest problem probably will be how to make the most effective use of the limited number of people available for the job. In this case, however, we will have the assistance of the many private organizations who already have developed large programs in health, education, and agriculture for all parts of the world.

MR. QUEEN: I gather that you are speaking primarily of technical assistance, Mr. Thorp. What about the question of foreign investments?

MR. THORP: Most responsible officials in these countries clearly understand that the effectiveness of such technical assistance is limited unless you have capital investment to go with it. I think that there is common agreement too, to use Mr. Truman's phrase, that the old imperialism is dead. Where foreign capital does invest in a country, it should be run so as to benefit the people there.

At the same time, I must point out that in order to attract capital for the development of a country, conditions must exist for fair and equitable treatment of the investor—no unjust taxation or excessive interference in local administration, just to mention two instances. And let me repeat your earlier point—that foreign investments can only help start a country on the road to economic progress. The people themselves must have enough faith in their future to put their own savings to work in factories and in the land. The United States got its own start substantially through foreign capital but over the long run it has been the money that Americans have invested that really has brought this country to its present state of development.

MR. QUEEN: We've discussed some of the broader aspects of Point Four, Mr. Thorp. Now can you tell us how the program stands today?

MR. THORP: The next step is approval by Congress. I think it is safe to say that some of the first projects will get under way a few months after passage of the bill. You may be sure however that when the program is approved we are going to make every effort to do our share to get knowledge and help to those areas of the world that need it just as speedily as possible. Economic development is a long, slow process, but with full cooperation by everyone, I believe that rapid progress can be made.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Official Records, Second Year

- 175th and 176th meetings: 5 August 1947. No. 70. 51 pp. printed. 50¢.
- 177th meeting: 6 August 1947. No. 71. 29 pp. printed. 30¢.
- 178th meeting: 7 August 1947. No. 72. printed. 30¢.
- 179th meeting: 11 August 1947. No. 73. printed. 40¢.
- 180th and 181st meetings: 12 August 1947. No. 74. printed. 50¢.
- 182d meeting: 13 August 1947. No. 75. 22 pp. printed. 25¢.
- 183rd and 184th meetings: 14 August 1947. No. 76. 38 pp. printed. 40¢.
- 185th meeting: 15 August 1947. No. 77. 26 pp. printed. 25¢.
- 186th meeting: 18 August 1947. No. 78. 29 pp. printed. 30¢.
- 187th and 188th meetings: 19 August 1947. No. 79. 45 pp. printed. 45¢.
- 189th meeting: 20 August 1947. No. 80. 14 pp. printed. 15¢.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Provisional Agenda Ninth Session ECOSOC

U.N. doc. E/1826
Dated May 28, 1949

I. After consultation with the President, the Secretary-General has the honour to submit, in accordance with Rules 7, 9 and 10, the provisional agenda for the ninth session of the Economic and Social Council, commencing at 11 a. m. on 5 July 1949 at Geneva.

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on the factors bearing upon the establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East
3. Report of the second session of the Transport and Communications Commission: inland transport in the Middle East
4. International facilities for the promotion of training in public administration
5. Question of the election of three members of the Economic Board for Palestine
6. Report of the Secretary-General on housing and town and country planning
7. Study of statelessness
8. Report of the fourth session of the Economic and Employment Commission
9. Economic development of under-developed countries
10. Measures to increase availability of food
11. Availability of DDT insecticides for combating malaria in agricultural areas
12. Report of the third session of the Transport and Communications Commission
13. Report of the second session of the Fiscal Commission
14. Report of the fourth session of the Statistical Commission
15. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Europe¹
16. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East¹
17. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Latin America¹
18. Report of the fourth session of the Population Commission
19. Report of the fourth session of the Social Commission
20. World social and cultural situation (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
21. Social problems of the aboriginal populations and other under-developed social groups of the American continent (General Assembly resolution of 11 May 1949)
22. Report of the fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights
23. Survey of forced labour and measures for its abolition
24. The problem of slavery (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
25. Trade union rights (freedom of association)
26. Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on declaration of death of missing persons
27. Report of the third session of the Commission on the Status of Women
28. Report of the third session of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press
29. Freedom of information: Resolutions from the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
30. (i) Report of the fourth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(ii) Question of exemption of "Valbine" from the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1925 on Narcotic Drugs. Item proposed by the Secretary-General
31. Report of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
32. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Appeal for Children
33. Implementation of recommendations on economic and social matters
34. Relations with and co-ordination of specialized agencies
35. Report of the International Labour Organization
36. Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
37. Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
38. Report of the World Health Organization
39. Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization
40. Report of the International Telecommunication Union
41. Report of the Universal Postal Union
42. Report of the International Refugee Organization
43. Relations with inter-governmental organizations
44. Reports of the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
45. Co-ordination of cartographic services of specialized agencies and international organizations

¹ Including the question of the number of sessions in 1949.

46. Use of the Central Library at Geneva by the United Nations and the specialized agencies
47. Calendar of conferences for 1950
48. Election of one-third of the members of the Economic and Employment, Transport and Communications, Fiscal, Statistical, Population, Social, Human Rights, and Status of Women Commissions; and of fifteen members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
49. Unemployment and full employment. Item proposed by the World Federation of Trade Unions
50. Summary of financial implications of actions of the Council
51. Confirmation of members of commissions
52. Election of members of the Agenda Committee for the tenth session

II. The procedure to be followed by the Council in the consideration of the above items will form the subject of recommendations by the Agenda Committee in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. The Agenda Committee (consisting of the President, the two Vice-Presidents of the Council and the representatives of Denmark and India) is scheduled to meet at Geneva on 29 June 1949.

III. In connection with the composition of delegations, the Secretary-General draws the attention of members of the Council to his letter of 20 April 1949, in which reference was made to the statement of the President at the 278th meeting of the eighth session of the Council (E/W.11) with respect to the heavy agenda of the ninth session and to the necessity of holding six meetings a day, i. e., three meetings at a time, from an early date in the session.

IV. The Secretary-General also draws the attention of the members of the Council to resolution 218 (VIII) by which the Council, in order to facilitate the work of the Agenda Committee, decided to invite members of the Council to communicate to the Secretary-General any comments which they may have on the provisional agenda.

Notes

Several of the basic documents which should have been distributed on the same date as the provisional agenda for the ninth session, in application of Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, will be issued with some delay in view of the fact that the facilities of the technical services of the Secretariat were primarily at the disposal of the General Assembly until 18 May.

Items

1. See rule 13 of the rules of procedure.
2. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.270.
Council resolution 107 (VI)
General Assembly resolution 199 (III)
E/AC.26/16; Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on the proposed economic commission for the Middle East, distributed on 3 June 1948,

E/AC.26/16/Add.3, E/AC.26/16/Corr. 1
E/850, distributed on 10 July 1948

E/919: Letter from the representative of Egypt concerning headquarters of proposed commission, distributed on 4 August 1948

E/814: Letter from the representative of Pakistan on application of Pakistan for membership in proposed commission, distributed on 10 June 1948

3. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.270

E/789, Part III, paragraph 2 (a), and Resolution 4, distributed on 19 May 1948, E/789/Add.1 and E/789/Add.2

4. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

General Assembly resolution 246 (III)

Council resolution 132 (VI)

E/849: Report of the Secretary-General, distributed on 7 July 1948

E/1336: Report of the Secretary-General distributed on 23 May 1949

5. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

General Assembly resolution 181 (II)

Special Assembly resolution 186 (S-2)

Council resolution 112 (VI)

6. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

Council resolution 155 (VII), F

E/1107: Communication from the World Health Organization, distributed on 28 January 1949

E/1343: Report of the Secretary-General to be distributed in the first week of June 1949

7. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227 Council resolution 116 (VI), D

E/1112: Report of the Secretary-General, Part I, distributed on 1 February 1949

E/1112/Add.1: Report of the Secretary-General, Part II, to be distributed on 25 May 1949

8. Report of the fourth session of the Economic and Employment Commission to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission which convened on 9 May 1949

In connection with that part of the report which deals with the subject of economic stability and full employment, the Council received, under its resolution 104 (VI), document E/1111 and addenda 1-6 containing replies from governments and specialized agencies to the questionnaire on this subject. The analysis of these replies is being completed by the Secretariat and will be made available early in July

In connection with Council resolution 139 (VII) on the question of the future organization and terms of reference of the Commission and its Sub-Commissions, the views of the governments are contained in E/CN.1/63 and addenda. See also E/CN.1/62

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Third, there must be an international structure capable of adjusting international differences and maintaining peace.

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Our national strength is not, however, simply a matter of weapons and trained men. Even more important are our economic growth and continued prosperity.

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Our economy is the center of a world economy. The hope of economic revival throughout the world depends in large measure upon the prosperity of the United States. If our production and purchasing power are badly impaired, if the buying and selling and investing that we do in other parts of the world are cut off, other nations will be plunged into chaos and despair.

It is a prime belief of the Communist philosophy that our kind of economy is doomed to failure. The Communists predict that our prosperity will collapse—bringing the rest of the free world down with it. But they are wrong—wrong as they can be.

We know more today about keeping our economy strong than we have ever known before. We know how to strengthen our economy through the expansion of production and purchasing power and the improvement of standards of living. We understand that constantly rising national output, increasing real wages, and a fair income for farmers are basic elements of our economic strength.

To maintain these elements of prosperity, it is not sufficient to drift with the tide. We must take advantage of the new opportunities, the increased demands which result from the natural growth of our population. We must develop our natural resources and restore those we have depleted or wasted. We must establish a fair distribution of business opportunity; we must have

a free labor movement able to hold its own at the bargaining table; we must protect the purchasing power of Americans against the hazards and misfortunes of life.

These steps are necessary if we are to continue strong and prosperous. That is why our domestic programs for the development of resources, for protection against economic hazards, for the improvement of social conditions, are fundamental to our national effort for peace.

The second condition essential to peace is that other nations, as well as our own, must be strong and prosperous.

We need other nations as our allies in the cause of human freedom. We have seen free nations lost to the democratic way of life because of economic disaster. We know that despair over economic conditions will turn men away from freedom and into the hands of dictators.

It is to our interest, therefore, to aid other nations to restore and maintain their economic health. Our aim is not only to help other nations to help themselves, but also to encourage economic cooperation among them.

We have taken the lead in cooperating with other nations to restore a mutually beneficial system of world trade. No nation today can achieve prosperity in isolation. Only through participation in the trade of the world can a country raise its own standards of living and contribute to the welfare of other nations.

For years before the war, world trade was crippled by high tariffs, import quotas, exchange manipulation, and other artificial devices for securing commercial advantage. These practices were a symptom of international anarchy. They resulted, ultimately, in idle ships, idle men, and economic chaos.

We have come a long way toward correcting these evils. Since 1934, we have worked out a multitude of agreements with other countries to reduce specific tariff barriers. In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1948, we struck a world-wide blow at these obstacles to trade.

But this work is not yet finished. If we are to succeed it is vital that the authority to negotiate reciprocal-trade agreements be extended. We should then go on to establish a permanent international trade organization to apply standards of fair dealing in the commerce among nations.

The same cooperative principle has been applied in our great undertaking to restore the economies of the Western European nations to a self-sustaining basis. The food, fuel, and equipment which we have sent to Europe have been matched by the efforts which these nations have made to restore their own economies and to cooperate with one another in increasing their production and raising their standards of living.

It is fair to say that the European Recovery Program has halted the social and economic disintegration which threatened the countries of Western Europe with Communism and civil strife.

Department of State Bulletin

Nevertheless, the European Recovery Program is still in its early stages. At the outset it was estimated that it would take four years before these countries could again become independent of special economic aid. Only a little more than one year has passed since we began.

If we were to falter now and cut down our aid, the momentum of recovery would be destroyed. The people of these countries would be thrown into confusion, and their advance toward economic self-reliance would be blocked. A slash in the funds available for European recovery at this time would be the worst kind of false economy. It would cancel the hopes and the plans of the Western European nations. It would be a great gain for Communism.

I am confident we shall not make this mistake.

Our concern with the economic health of the world also extends to its underdeveloped regions. The prospects for peace will be immeasurably brighter if we can offer a future of hope and a better life to the people of these regions. In these areas there are millions who for centuries have known nothing but exploitation and poverty, and whose economic life is still primitive.

I have offered a program for bringing these people the benefits of our modern civilization. It is not a program of relief. While it is intended ultimately to bring about a great movement of capital through the channels of private investment for the development of these poverty-stricken regions, it is not a program of imperialism. The development of these areas offers enormous potential benefits to a growing world economy.

We have to lay the foundations for this program with care. I expect shortly to send to the Congress recommendations for initial legislation. This will be but the first step of many that we shall take, over the years to come, in this cooperative effort to better the living standards and to unlock the human skills and the natural resources of the underdeveloped parts of the globe.

The third condition essential for peace is an international structure capable of suppressing international violence. However well conceived our economic programs may be, they cannot succeed unless there is some assurance against the outbreak of aggression. Neither our own prosperity nor the prosperity of other nations can survive unless we can protect the operations of economic life from the threat of war.

Such protection depends on two factors. First, there must be constant efforts by all nations to adjust their differences peacefully. Second, there must be an agreement among nations to employ overwhelming force against armed aggression.

The United Nations is a valuable instrument for accomplishing these ends. It has already achieved the peaceful settlement of difficult issues. It has stopped hostilities in the Near East and in Indonesia. It has done a great deal to explore and find solutions for many of the economic and social problems which afflict the world.

Much remains to be done, however, to carry out the principles of the United Nations. Within the terms of the United Nations Charter, we and certain other countries have undertaken to provide greater assurance against the danger of armed conflict. That is the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. The idea behind this treaty—the association of democratic nations for mutual defense—is well understood in this country. Perhaps we do not understand, however, the importance of this pact in the eyes of the other democratic nations which are parties to it. They have been greatly weakened by the war. They have been haunted by the fear of again becoming the scene of conflict. By assuring them of our support the pact goes a long way to dispel their fears.

I have been greatly heartened by the unanimous report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate this past week in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty. I believe that it will soon be passed by an overwhelming majority in the Senate. The effect of this action will be immediate and far-reaching in allaying the fears which have retarded economic recovery in Europe.

It is of vital importance that the Atlantic pact be followed by a program of military aid to increase the effective strength of the free nations against aggression. This military assistance program—based upon mutual help—will give additional confidence to the people of those nations as they continue to rebuild their economies.

These measures will bring a stability to the democratic nations of Europe, which has not existed since the end of the war. They will at the same time contribute directly to the security of the United States.

I have discussed the three essential elements of lasting peace—a strong and prosperous United States; a strong and prosperous community of free nations; an international organization capable of preventing aggression.

We have given greatly of our effort and our strength to build a firm and enduring foreign policy upon these essentials. The burdens we have had to assume in this enterprise have been unusual. The size of the national budget shows that we are engaged in an undertaking without parallel in the history of our country or of the world.

But the goal we seek is a great one, and worth the price. Never has a nation had the opportunity which we have today to do so much for the peace and prosperity of mankind. Never has a nation had a better chance of reaching this high goal.

We must not falter now.

We must not defeat our own efforts by doing only half the job that lies before us.

The brave men, whose memory we honor here, did all that was required of them. They did not fail us. We must not fail them in our efforts to reach the goal for which they died.

We must press on in the confidence that we will succeed in the mission a divine Providence has assigned to us.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

U.S.-U.N. Cooperation in Point-4 Program

STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY WEBB

[Released to the press June 8]

The plan announced by Secretary-General Lie for an expanded program of technical assistance for economic development to be carried out through the United Nations and specialized agencies was prepared in response to a resolution introduced by the United States at the eighth meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council at Lake Success, in February of this year.¹ It will be discussed at the Ninth Meeting of the UN-Ecosoc, which will convene in July at Geneva, and its various parts will also be considered by the various specialized agencies who participated in preparing it.

It is the intention of this government to co-operate wholeheartedly with the United Nations in this program. As President Truman pointed out in his inaugural address, "This should be a co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable." We hope that other governments will also participate extensively in this program, as they do in the other activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The appropriations requested from Congress to carry out the Point-4 Program will include funds for United States participation in the technical assistance activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is anticipated that there will be a substantial need for additional technical cooperation activities, carried out on a bilateral basis, to supplement the many activities to be carried out through the United Nations and other international organizations.

WORLD RESPONSE TO THE POINT-4 PROGRAM

Interview with Assistant Secretary Thorp over the Voice of America²

MR. QUEEN [Economic Commentator]: Good evening. In the next few days, the American Congress will be asked to approve legislation providing technical assistance and fostering capital investment for the less developed areas of the world.

Here is what you might call the first concrete, global application of what President Truman meant when he said last January 20th: "Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food,

more clothing, more materials for housing, and more technical power to lighten their burdens."

In a sense, this idea of a first program is misleading. In one area, Latin America, this country has over the past decade exchanged its skills and knowledge with 20 other nations—teaching farmers how to grow different and more foods, wiping out century-old diseases, bringing new tools and techniques to our neighbors to the south and showing their peoples how to use them.

The idea of a program is misleading in a deeper sense. For this is not a single plan or even a series of plans. What we are seeing here is the emergence of a policy that will extend to virtually every aspect of American foreign relations—with people as much as countries. It is a recognition of the fact that where the threat of oppression, ignorance, hunger, and despair grip any segment of the free world, they menace the welfare and liberties of everyone, everywhere—this nation included.

What is developing in Washington, therefore, is not simply one program with a beginning and an end but a basic and major element of American foreign policy. Although some parts of it will produce results relatively quickly, its operation will extend over many decades and in many ways.

There are two other points to note about this policy and program. First, it is cooperative. The United States is joining with other countries and the United Nations to bring into play the full use of all skills of all countries.

The second point is that the program will be called into action only by the choice and willingness of the nations desiring such help. This assistance, moreover, whether in the form of technical aid or measures to encourage capital investment cannot be effective unless it is based on and supported by the resources, funds and determination on the part of the countries and the peoples themselves.

As experts in Washington see it, here lie the possibilities for the greatest advances in world health and security. Any attempt to measure

¹ *Technical Assistance for Economic Development: Plan for an expanded co-operative programme through the United Nations and the specialized agencies.* [U. N. doc. 1327/Add. 1, May 1949] viii, 329 pp. Printed. \$2.50. For text of resolutions relating to economic development, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 360.

² Given over the Voice of America short-wave system on June 9, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

these in terms of money expenditures is short-sighted and incorrect. How do you measure the elimination of cholera, typhus, or bubonic plague for hundreds of thousands of humans, who, on the average, have never lived beyond the age of thirty? A small group of men will instruct some hundreds of others on methods of improving crop production by 20 or 30 or 50 percent. These hundreds, in turn, pass on their knowledge to thousands. A pilot plant, small in cost and operation, shows manufacturers new uses for local resources. How do you estimate, in money, the ultimate value of these operations?

We are fortunate in having with us today in the Voice of America studios in Washington, the man responsible for developing this new concept in American foreign policy—Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Mr. Thorp, what has been the response thus far to President Truman's program?

MR. THORP: I should start by saying that not only since the President's speech but for the past 4 years, I have had callers from countries in all parts of the world telling me about their hopes and needs in the field of economic development. These haven't been merely the point of view of some government officials. They usually represent the needs and aspirations of the people themselves back in the home country who are demanding that their governments find ways and means of bringing economic betterment to their lives. Of course, since the President's speech, these requests to the American Government have multiplied considerably. Almost every week we get new messages from our embassies from countries asking for information and proposing specific projects for development. Last week the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced a proposed program of world-wide technical assistance to be carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies and to cost 36 million dollars in 1950 and 50 million dollars in 1951. There has never been any question of the interest of other countries in this program. The greatest problem probably will be how to make the most effective use of the limited number of people available for the job. In this case, however, we will have the assistance of the many private organizations who already have developed large programs in health, education, and agriculture for all parts of the world.

MR. QUEEN: I gather that you are speaking primarily of technical assistance, Mr. Thorp. What about the question of foreign investments?

MR. THORP: Most responsible officials in these countries clearly understand that the effectiveness of such technical assistance is limited unless you have capital investment to go with it. I think that there is common agreement too, to use Mr. Truman's phrase, that the old imperialism is dead. Where foreign capital does invest in a country, it should be run so as to benefit the people there.

At the same time, I must point out that in order to attract capital for the development of a country, conditions must exist for fair and equitable treatment of the investor—no unjust taxation or excessive interference in local administration, just to mention two instances. And let me repeat your earlier point—that foreign investments can only help start a country on the road to economic progress. The people themselves must have enough faith in their future to put their own savings to work in factories and in the land. The United States got its own start substantially through foreign capital but over the long run it has been the money that Americans have invested that really has brought this country to its present state of development.

MR. QUEEN: We've discussed some of the broader aspects of Point Four, Mr. Thorp. Now can you tell us how the program stands today?

MR. THORP: The next step is approval by Congress. I think it is safe to say that some of the first projects will get under way a few months after passage of the bill. You may be sure however that when the program is approved we are going to make every effort to do our share to get knowledge and help to those areas of the world that need it just as speedily as possible. Economic development is a long, slow process, but with full cooperation by everyone, I believe that rapid progress can be made.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Official Records, Second Year

- 175th and 176th meetings: 5 August 1947. No. 70. 51 pp. printed. 50¢.
- 177th meeting: 6 August 1947. No. 71. 29 pp. printed. 30¢.
- 178th meeting: 7 August 1947. No. 72. printed. 30¢.
- 179th meeting: 11 August 1947. No. 73. printed. 40¢.
- 180th and 181st meetings: 12 August 1947. No. 74. printed. 50¢.
- 182d meeting: 13 August 1947. No. 75. 22 pp. printed. 25¢.
- 183rd and 184th meetings: 14 August 1947. No. 76. 38 pp. printed. 40¢.
- 185th meeting: 15 August 1947. No. 77. 26 pp. printed. 25¢.
- 186th meeting: 18 August 1947. No. 78. 29 pp. printed. 30¢.
- 187th and 188th meetings: 19 August 1947. No. 79. 45 pp. printed. 45¢.
- 189th meeting: 20 August 1947. No. 80. 14 pp. printed. 15¢.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Provisional Agenda Ninth Session ECOSOC

U.N. doc. E/1826
Dated May 28, 1949

I. After consultation with the President, the Secretary-General has the honour to submit, in accordance with Rules 7, 9 and 10, the provisional agenda for the ninth session of the Economic and Social Council, commencing at 11 a. m. on 5 July 1949 at Geneva.

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on the factors bearing upon the establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East
3. Report of the second session of the Transport and Communications Commission: inland transport in the Middle East
4. International facilities for the promotion of training in public administration
5. Question of the election of three members of the Economic Board for Palestine
6. Report of the Secretary-General on housing and town and country planning
7. Study of statelessness
8. Report of the fourth session of the Economic and Employment Commission
9. Economic development of under-developed countries
10. Measures to increase availability of food
11. Availability of DDT insecticides for combating malaria in agricultural areas
12. Report of the third session of the Transport and Communications Commission
13. Report of the second session of the Fiscal Commission
14. Report of the fourth session of the Statistical Commission
15. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Europe¹
16. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East¹
17. Annual report of the Economic Commission for Latin America¹
18. Report of the fourth session of the Population Commission
19. Report of the fourth session of the Social Commission
20. World social and cultural situation (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
21. Social problems of the aboriginal populations and other under-developed social groups of the American continent (General Assembly resolution of 11 May 1949)
22. Report of the fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights
23. Survey of forced labour and measures for its abolition
24. The problem of slavery (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
25. Trade union rights (freedom of association)
26. Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on declaration of death of missing persons
27. Report of the third session of the Commission on the Status of Women
28. Report of the third session of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press
29. Freedom of information: Resolutions from the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information (General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949)
30. (i) Report of the fourth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(ii) Question of exemption of "Valbine" from the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1925 on Narcotic Drugs. Item proposed by the Secretary-General
31. Report of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
32. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Appeal for Children
33. Implementation of recommendations on economic and social matters
34. Relations with and co-ordination of specialized agencies
35. Report of the International Labour Organization
36. Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
37. Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
38. Report of the World Health Organization
39. Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization
40. Report of the International Telecommunication Union
41. Report of the Universal Postal Union
42. Report of the International Refugee Organization
43. Relations with inter-governmental organizations
44. Reports of the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
45. Co-ordination of cartographic services of specialized agencies and international organizations

¹ Including the question of the number of sessions in 1949.

46. Use of the Central Library at Geneva by the United Nations and the specialized agencies
47. Calendar of conferences for 1950
48. Election of one-third of the members of the Economic and Employment, Transport and Communications, Fiscal, Statistical, Population, Social, Human Rights, and Status of Women Commissions; and of fifteen members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
49. Unemployment and full employment. Item proposed by the World Federation of Trade Unions
50. Summary of financial implications of actions of the Council
51. Confirmation of members of commissions
52. Election of members of the Agenda Committee for the tenth session

II. The procedure to be followed by the Council in the consideration of the above items will form the subject of recommendations by the Agenda Committee in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. The Agenda Committee (consisting of the President, the two Vice-Presidents of the Council and the representatives of Denmark and India) is scheduled to meet at Geneva on 29 June 1949.

III. In connection with the composition of delegations, the Secretary-General draws the attention of members of the Council to his letter of 20 April 1949, in which reference was made to the statement of the President at the 278th meeting of the eighth session of the Council (E/W.11) with respect to the heavy agenda of the ninth session and to the necessity of holding six meetings a day, i. e., three meetings at a time, from an early date in the session.

IV. The Secretary-General also draws the attention of the members of the Council to resolution 218 (VIII) by which the Council, in order to facilitate the work of the Agenda Committee, decided to invite members of the Council to communicate to the Secretary-General any comments which they may have on the provisional agenda.

Notes

Several of the basic documents which should have been distributed on the same date as the provisional agenda for the ninth session, in application of Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, will be issued with some delay in view of the fact that the facilities of the technical services of the Secretariat were primarily at the disposal of the General Assembly until 18 May.

Items

1. See rule 13 of the rules of procedure.
2. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.270.
Council resolution 107 (VI)
General Assembly resolution 199 (III)
E/AC.26/16; Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on the proposed economic commission for the Middle East, distributed on 3 June 1948,

E/AC.26/16/Add.3, E/AC.26/16/Corr. 1
E/850, distributed on 10 July 1948

E/919: Letter from the representative of Egypt concerning headquarters of proposed commission, distributed on 4 August 1948

E/814: Letter from the representative of Pakistan on application of Pakistan for membership in proposed commission, distributed on 10 June 1948

3. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.270

E/789, Part III, paragraph 2 (a), and Resolution 4, distributed on 19 May 1948, E/789/Add.1 and E/789/Add.2

4. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

General Assembly resolution 246 (III)

Council resolution 132 (VI)

E/849: Report of the Secretary-General, distributed on 7 July 1948

E/1336: Report of the Secretary-General distributed on 23 May 1949

5. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

General Assembly resolution 181 (II)

Special Assembly resolution 186 (S-2)

Council resolution 112 (VI)

6. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227

Council resolution 155 (VII), F

E/1107: Communication from the World Health Organization, distributed on 28 January 1949

E/1343: Report of the Secretary-General to be distributed in the first week of June 1949

7. Item postponed from the eighth session: see E/SR.227 Council resolution 116 (VI), D

E/1112: Report of the Secretary-General, Part I, distributed on 1 February 1949

E/1112/Add.1: Report of the Secretary-General, Part II, to be distributed on 25 May 1949

8. Report of the fourth session of the Economic and Employment Commission to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission which convened on 9 May 1949

In connection with that part of the report which deals with the subject of economic stability and full employment, the Council received, under its resolution 104 (VI), document E/1111 and addenda 1-6 containing replies from governments and specialized agencies to the questionnaire on this subject. The analysis of these replies is being completed by the Secretariat and will be made available early in July

In connection with Council resolution 139 (VII) on the question of the future organization and terms of reference of the Commission and its Sub-Commissions, the views of the governments are contained in E/CN.1/63 and addenda. See also E/CN.1/62

9. General Assembly resolution 200 (III)
General Assembly resolution of 17 May 1949,
A/898
Council resolutions 179 (VIII) and 180
(VIII)
 - (i) E/1345: Report of the Secretary-General, under Council resolution 179 (VIII), on measures already devised by the Council and the specialized agencies to promote economic development and raise the standards of living of under-developed countries; to be distributed on 27 May 1949
 - (ii) E/1333: Report of the Secretary-General, under Council resolution 179 (VIII), on methods of financing economic development of under-developed countries; to be distributed on 28 May 1949
 - (iii) E/1335: Second report of the Secretary-General, under General Assembly resolution 200 (III), on technical assistance for economic development; to be distributed on 25 May 1949
 - (iv) E/1327: report of the Secretary-General, under Council resolution 180 (VIII), on a comprehensive plan for an expanded co-operative programme of technical assistance for economic development; to be distributed on 30 May 1949
10. General Assembly resolution 202 (III)
Council resolution 183 (VIII)
E/1339: Report of the Fao distributed on 23 May 1949
11. Council resolution 184 (VIII) Report of the Secretary-General to be distributed on 25 May 1949.
12. E/CN.2/65/Rev.1: Report of the third session of the Transport and Communications Commission, distributed on 31 March 1949
13. E/1104: Report of the second session of the Fiscal Commission, distributed on 3 February 1949, E/1104/Add.1 and E/1104/Corr.1
14. E/1312: Report of the fourth session of the Statistical Commission, to be distributed on 24 May 1949
15. E/1328: Annual report of the Economic Commission for Europe, to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission, which convened on 9 May 1949
General Assembly resolution 206 (III)
16. E/1329: Annual report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, including the report of the Committee of the Whole, to be distributed on 30 May 1949
General Assembly resolution 206 (III)
17. E/1330: Annual report of the Economic Commission for Latin America, to be distributed after the second session of the Commission to convene on 29 May 1949
General Assembly resolution 206 (III)
18. E/1313: Report of the fourth session of the Population Commission, distributed on 23 May 1949
19. Report of the fourth session of the Social Commission, to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission which convened on 2 May 1949
Draft Convention for the suppression of the traffic in persons and of the exploitation of the prostitution of others, to be submitted to the Council by the Social Commission, in pursuance of resolution 155 (VII), E; to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission.
20. General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949 (A/879)
Memorandum by the Secretary-General to be distributed
21. General Assembly resolution of 11 May 1949. A/869
Memorandum by the Secretary-General to be distributed
22. (i) Report of the fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights, to be distributed after the fifth session of the Commission, which convened on 9 May 1949
(ii) E/CN.4/169: Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the question of inclusion of court decisions in the Yearbook on Human Rights, prepared for the fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights, to be revised, if necessary, in the light of action by the Commission
(iii) E/1315: Report of the fourth session dealing with the election of members of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press, distributed on 15 April 1949 (for information)
23. Council resolution 195 (VIII)
E/1337: Report of the Secretary-General, distributed on 23 May 1949
24. General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949, A/877
Memorandum by the Secretary-General to be distributed
25. Council resolution 193 (VIII)
Consultations between the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the ILO, entered into in accordance with Council resolution 193 (VIII), are still in progress. It is anticipated that the Secretary-General's report on the results of these consultations will be circulated in the course of June
26. Council resolution 209 (VIII)
Report of the *ad hoc* Committee to be distributed after the session of the Committee to convene at Geneva on 6 June 1949
27. E/1316: Report of the third session of the Commission on the Status of Women, distributed on 19 April 1949, E/1316/Add.1 distributed on 21 May 1949.
28. Council resolution 197 (VIII)
Report of the Sub-Commission to be distributed

uted after the third session of the Sub-Commission to convene at Lake Success on 31 May 1949

29. General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1949, A/876, B

Memorandum by the Secretary-General on resolutions 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 23, 24, 26, 30-34, 36, 37 and 40 from the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information to be distributed on 24 May 1949

Memorandum by the Secretary-General on resolution 9 from the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, to be distributed in the first week of June 1949

30. (i) Report of the fourth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to be distributed after the fourth session of the Commission which convened on 16 May 1949

(ii) E/1324: Memorandum of the Secretary-General on transmission by the Economic and Social Council to the Government of France of a communication from the World Health Organization under Article 8 of the Geneva Convention of 19 February 1925 on Narcotic Drugs, regarding a request for "Valbine" to be exempted from the provisions of the Convention; distributed on 6 May 1949

31. The report of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund will include the report required by General Assembly resolution 215 (III) to the extension of the United Nations Appeal for Children during 1949; to be distributed in July 1949

32. Council resolution 207 (VIII)

E/1346: Report of the Secretary-General to be distributed on 25 May 1949

33. General Assembly resolution 119 (II)

Council resolution 210 (VIII)

E/1325: Report of the Secretary-General distributed on 23 May 1949

34. (i) E/1340: Fifth report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, to be distributed on 25 May 1949

(ii) E/1342: Report of the Secretary-General on co-ordination of fellowship programmes, to be distributed on 30 May 1949

(iii) E/1341: Report of the Secretary-General on co-ordination of migration activities, to be distributed on 30 May 1949

(iv) E/1347: Communication from the Director-General of the ILO on manpower programmes to be distributed on 25 May 1949

(v) E/1344 and E/1344/Add.1. Report of the Secretary-General, under Council resolution 128 (VI), on organization of the Economic and Social Affairs Departments and on the work programmes of the Economic and Social Affairs De-

partments and of the Commissions of the Council; to be distributed after reports of all Commissions are available (for information)

(vi) Comparative Review of the work programmes of the United Nations and specialized agencies prepared in pursuance of Council resolution 166 (VII); to be distributed in the first half of June; a revision to be distributed after reports of all Commissions become available (for information)

(vii) Catalogue of Economic and Social projects, prepared in pursuance of Council resolution 128 (VI); printed document distributed on 26 April 1949 (for information)

(viii) E/1317: Report of the Secretary-General, under General Assembly resolutions 50 (I) and 124 (II), on the action taken in pursuance of the agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies; to be distributed on 31 May 1949

(ix) E/1320: Communication from the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation on the agreement between the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation, to be distributed on 31 May 1949

(x) E/1348: Report of the Secretary-General on the agreement between the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in accordance with Article XXI of the agreement, to be distributed in the first week of June 1949

(xi) E/1331: Report of the Secretary-General on general co-ordination matters, to be distributed on 9 June 1949

35. Report of the International Labour Organization, to be distributed at the end of May 1949

36. E/1321: Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, distributed on 27 April 1949

37. E/1349: Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to be distributed at the end of May 1949

38. E/1350: Report of the World Health Organization to be distributed at the end of May 1949

39. E/1338: Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization, distributed on 23 May 1949. A supplementary report will be distributed as soon as it becomes available.

40. E/1319: Report of the International Telecommunications Union, distributed on 27 April 1949

41. E/1323: Report of the Universal Postal Union, to be distributed in the beginning of June 1949

(Continued on page 794)

The United States in the United Nations

Commission on Human Rights

[June 11-17]

The Commission on Human Rights on June 16 completed action on the articles contained in the drafting committee's International Covenant of Human Rights. Five additional articles were approved during the week. One is designed to guarantee equality before the law and equal protection of the law, equal enjoyment of the rights defined in the covenant without any discrimination, and equal protection against incitement to such discrimination. Another is intended to provide that nothing in the covenant may be interpreted as implying any right for any state, group, or person to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the freedoms defined. Another provides that each state which becomes a party to the covenant will undertake to insure to the individuals within its jurisdiction the rights defined in the covenant.

The Commission tentatively approved an article which was to be a general limitation clause for the provisions of the covenant. The United States delegate recommended elimination of this article because the incorporation of limitations into each substantive article had made it unnecessary. The United States draft of the ratification article was adopted, under which the covenant would be open to all states.

Further action on the preamble, and two articles of the Committee's draft as well as on additional articles submitted by various governments was postponed until the next session of the Human Rights Commission.

Security Council Considers Membership

In accordance with the General Assembly resolution of December 8, 1948, the Security Council on June 16 began a reconsideration of 11 applications for membership in the United Nations which had previously failed to receive favorable recommendations.

The countries involved are: Albania, Mongolian People's Republic, Transjordan, Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland.

The meeting was called by Ambassador Arne Sunde of Norway, chairman during June, in order to inquire whether any of the members of the Council had changed their positions on the question, or whether any of the new members of the Council wished to express their opinions. Ambassador Sunde, as the representative of Norway, spoke in behalf of the idea of universal membership in the United Nations.

The representative of Argentina, Dr. José Arce, in the course of an 80-minute address to the Council, held that the Charter conferred final determination on membership applications upon the General Assembly rather than the Council, and that the veto power could not be used to block the passage of a membership application through the Security Council. Dr. Arce introduced resolutions calling for the admission to membership of Portugal, Transjordan, Italy, Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Ceylon.

Further discussion was postponed to the next meeting of the Council, which was scheduled for June 21.

Korea

The Korean Commission has appointed a subcommittee to observe and verify withdrawal of remaining United States occupation forces in Korea. Withdrawal of United States troops was begun last December in compliance with the General Assembly resolution calling for withdrawal of all occupation forces from Korea "as early as practicable," and the Korean Commission was given the responsibility of observing the withdrawal. Although the Soviet Union has reported that its forces have been withdrawn from north Korea, the Commission has never been permitted to visit the northern zone to verify this.

Palestine

Mark F. Ethridge on his return to the United States to resign as the United States representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, informed President Truman that the Arab-Israeli negotiations at Lausanne under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission are "deadlocked" and that both Israeli and Arab representatives must adopt "entirely new approaches" if a formal peace is to be reached.

Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission's working committee resolved that further study by the working committee of the General Assembly resolution, which endorsed the majority plan as a basis for an effective system of atomic control, is useless until the Big Five and Canada report that some basis for agreement exists. This decision was embodied in a resolution sponsored by Cuba and Argentina and was approved on June 15 by a vote of eight to two (Ukraine, U.S.S.R.), with Egypt abstaining.

U.S. Policy Toward Korea

Summary of Actions 1947-49

[Released to the press June 8]

On January 1 of this year the United States Government extended full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea.¹ In so doing, the United States welcomed into the community of free nations a new republic, born of the efforts of the United Nations, and of the United States as a principally interested power, to give effect to the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to freedom and national independence.

The United States Government, inspired by its historic ties of friendship with the Korean people and by its sincere interest in the spread of free institutions and representative government among the peoples of the world, entertains a particularly deep and sympathetic concern for the welfare of the Republic of Korea. As evidence of this concern, the United States is currently carrying out in Korea a program of economic and technical assistance designed to provide the economic stability without which political stability would be impossible. A request for authorization to continue and to strengthen this program during the coming fiscal year has already been submitted to the Congress. The United States has, moreover, maintained in Korea a military training mission whose function it has been to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of Korea in the development of its own security forces, in consonance with the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of November 14, 1947,² and has transferred to that government for those forces substantial amounts of military equipment and supplies under the authority of the Surplus Property Act. The transfer of such equipment and supplies is continuing, while the military training mission has recently been placed on a more formal basis with the establishment of a United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea. Other forms of assistance, such as that in the fields of education and vocational training, also have been and are being given to the Republic of Korea by the United States Government.

In pursuance of the recommendation contained in the General Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1948,³ to the effect that the occupying Powers should "withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable," the United States Government will soon have completed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from that country. As is clear from the broad program of assistance outlined above, this withdrawal in no way indi-

cates a lessening of United States interest in the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step toward the normalization of relations with that republic and a compliance on the part of the United States with the cited provision of the December 12 resolution of the General Assembly.

While the United States has given unstintingly of its material assistance and political support in order that the Republic of Korea might grow and prosper, this government recognizes that the Korean problem remains one of international con-

For the Department of State: \$1,955,000 to continue the information and education program in Korea, for which responsibility was transferred from the Army to the Department of State on January 1, 1949.—Request by the President for supplemental estimates for fiscal year 1950.

cern and that it is only through continued support by the entire community of nations to which that republic owes its existence that the security and stability of this new nation can be assured during the critical months and years that lie ahead. So long as the authority of the Republic of Korea continues to be challenged within its own territory by the alien tyranny which has been arbitrarily imposed upon the people of north Korea, the need for such support will be a vital one.

The United States Government has already pledged its support to the United Nations Commission on Korea in its efforts to assist the Korean people toward the goal of a free and united Korea. It believes, however, that this goal can be achieved only through the continued strengthening of the freely elected and democratic Government of the Republic of Korea as an embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of all Koreans to the freedom and independence for which they have worked and waited so long.

Request to Congress for Continuing Economic Assistance

Message of the President to the Congress

[Released to the press by the White House June 8]

To the Congress of the United States:

I recommend that the Congress authorize the continuation of economic assistance to the Repub-

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1949, p. 59.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1947, p. 1081.

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1948, p. 760.

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lic of Korea for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950.

The United States is now providing relief and a small amount of assistance in rehabilitation to the Republic of Korea under Public Law 793—80th Congress. The continuation of that assistance is of great importance to the successful achievement of the foreign policy aims of the United States. The authority of the present Act extends only until June 30, 1949. For this reason legislation is urgently needed and I am hopeful that the Congress may give it early consideration.

The people of the United States have long had sympathetic feelings for the Korean people. American missionaries, supported by American churches of many denominations, brought spiritual guidance, education and medical aid to the Korean people during their forty years of Japanese bondage. All Americans who have come to know the Korean people appreciate their fierce passion for freedom and their keen desire to become an independent nation.

Early in the war with Japan, it was resolved that Korea should be liberated. In the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943, the United States joined with the United Kingdom and China to express their determination that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, with which the Soviet Union associated itself upon its entrance into the war against Japan in the following month. With our victory over Japan, it was hoped that the Korean nation would be reborn. Unfortunately, however, only the people of Korea south of the 38° parallel have thus far attained their freedom and independence.

The present division of Korea along the 38° parallel was never intended by the United States. The sole purpose of the line along the 38° parallel was to facilitate acceptance by the Soviet and United States forces of the surrender of Japanese troops north and south of that line. Immediately after the completion of the Japanese surrender, the United States through direct negotiations with the Soviet Union sought to restore the unity of Korea.

For two years these efforts were rendered unavailing by the attitude of the Soviet Union. When it became apparent that further delay would be injurious to the interests of the Korean people, the United States submitted the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the hope that the United Nations could assist the people of Korea to assume their rightful place as an independent, democratic nation.

By vote of an overwhelming majority, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on November 14, 1947, calling for an election, under the observation of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to choose a representative National Assembly for the purpose of drafting a democratic

constitution and establishing a national government. The Soviet Union refused to permit the United Nations Commission to enter its zone. Consequently, the right of the Korean people to participate in a free election to establish a free government was confined to south Korea. As a result of this election, the Government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated August 15, 1948.

The General Assembly of the United Nations at its next session considered the report of its Commission and in December, 1948, adopted a resolution holding the Government of the Republic of Korea to be the validly elected, lawful government of the area in which elections were held under the Commission's observation—and the only such government in Korea. The General Assembly established a re-constituted Commission to consult with the occupying powers on the withdrawal of their forces and to continue to work for the unification of Korea under representative government.

The United States terminated its military government in Korea upon the inauguration of the Government of the Republic of Korea and recognized the new government on New Year's Day, 1949.

The December, 1948, resolution of the General Assembly called on the occupying powers to withdraw their forces as soon as practicable. The United States has thus far retained a small number of troops in Korea at the request of the Government of the Republic to give the Republic an opportunity to establish forces adequate to protect itself against internal disturbances and external attacks short of an aggressive war supported by a major power. A military advisory group requested by the Korean Government for training purposes will be retained in Korea after the withdrawal of United States troops.

The debilitated state in which the Korean economy was left by the Japanese has been accentuated by the separation of the hydroelectric power, coal and metal and fertilizer industries of the north from the agricultural and textile industries of the south and by the effects of continuing communist agitation. The United States has furnished the people of south Korea with basic relief during the period of military government. Despite such assistance, however, the Republic is still far short of being able to support itself, even at the present modest standard of living of its people. It is in urgent need of further assistance in the difficult period ahead until it can stand on its own feet economically.

The aid now being provided to Korea is essentially for basic relief. Without the continuation of such relief, its economy would collapse—invariably and rapidly. Bare relief alone, however, would not make it possible for the Republic to become self-supporting. The Republic would remain dependent upon the continuation of relief from the United States at a costly level into the in-

definite future—and subject to the same inevitable collapse at any time the relief should be withdrawn. For these reasons the aid granted should be not for mere relief but for recovery. The kind of program which is needed is the kind which the Congress has authorized for the countries of Western Europe and under which those countries have achieved such rapid progress toward recovery during the past year. Full advantage should be taken of the broad and successful experience in Western Europe by continuing responsibility for the administration of the Korean aid program in the Economic Cooperation Administration, which has been administering aid to Korea since January 1 of this year.

Prior to January 1 of this year, aid to Korea was administered by the Army as a part of its program for government and relief in occupied areas. The Budget which I submitted to the Congress in January contemplated that economic assistance to Korea would be continued outside of the Army's program for government and relief in occupied areas. The needs of the Republic of Korea for economic assistance have been carefully studied in the light of the latest available information. I am convinced that the sum of \$150,000,000 is the minimum aid essential during the coming year for progress toward economic recovery.

Such a recovery program will cost only a relatively small amount more than a bare relief program. Yet a recovery program—and only a recovery program—will enable the Republic of Korea to commence building up the coal production, electric power capacity and fertilizer production which are fundamental to the establishment of a self-supporting economy and to the termination of the need for aid from the United States. Aid in the restoration of the Korean economy should be less costly to the United States in the end than a continued program of relief.

The recovery program which is recommended is not only the soundest course economically but also the most effective from the standpoint of helping to achieve the objectives of peaceful and democratic conditions in the Far East.

Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value of the ideals and principles of democracy which the Republic is putting into practice are being matched against the practices of communism which have been imposed upon the people of north Korea. The survival and progress of the Republic toward a self-supporting, stable economy will have an immense and far-reaching influence on the people of Asia. Such progress by the young Republic will encourage the people of southern and southeastern Asia and the islands of the Pacific to resist and reject the Communist propaganda with which they are besieged. Moreover, the Korean Republic, by demonstrating the success and tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon to the people of northern Asia in resisting the

control of the communist forces which have overrun them.

The Republic of Korea, and the freedom-seeking people of north Korea held under Soviet domination, seek for themselves a united, self-governing and sovereign country, independent of foreign control and support and with membership in the United Nations. In their desire for unity and independence, they are supported by the United Nations.

The United States has a deep interest in the continuing progress of the Korean people toward these objectives. The most effective, practical aid which the United States can give toward reaching them will be to assist the Republic to move toward self-support at a decent standard of living. In the absence of such assistance, there can be no real hope of achieving a unified, free and democratic Korea.

If we are faithful to our ideals and mindful of our interest in establishing peaceful and prosperous conditions in the world, we will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 7, 1949.

Statement by Acting Secretary Webb made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 8, 1949

[Released to the press June 8]

The legislation before you, calling for a continuation of economic assistance to the young Republic of Korea is among the most important which the Department of State is supporting at this session of Congress.

For almost four years the United States has been intimately involved in Korea and in the growing pains of the new Republic. Although our troops who went to Korea to take the Japanese surrender have been progressively reduced in strength as the people of Korea became more able to take charge of their own affairs, the continuation of aid to Korea remains essential to the achievement of the foreign-policy objective of the United States.

As most of you will recall, on December 1, 1943, this government in association with the Governments of Great Britain and China made a solemn declaration at Cairo "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, with which the Soviet Union associated itself upon its declaration of war against Japan on August 8 of that year. The sudden surrender of Japan followed almost immediately. Decisions had to be made as to what Allied troops would be available at the proper time to take the surrender of the Japanese in the various territories con-

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cerned. In certain areas the British were chosen, in others the Chinese, in still others the Americans and the Russians.

In deciding who should take the surrender in Korea, our military authorities had to take into account the location and availability of both the United States and Soviet forces and the time required to move the necessary forces into Korea. As a result of a purely *ad hoc* military decision the line was drawn at the 38° parallel, and it was agreed that the United States forces would accept the Japanese surrender below that line and the forces of the U.S.S.R. would accept surrender above that line.

General Hodge and his soldiers landed in Korea in September 1945, for what everyone believed at that time would be a comparatively short occupation. We had just won a great victory in association with our Russian and other Allies. We together with the Russians pledged ourselves to assist in the formation of an independent Korea. The 38° line was adopted for military purposes only—it was not meant by us to be a barrier cutting Korea into two sections.

It soon became apparent, however, that the view of the United States as to the nature of the 38° parallel line was not shared by the Soviet occupation authorities in north Korea, who, from the very beginning, frustrated every attempt on the part of the United States Commander in the south to remove the artificial barrier thus created and to restore the economic, administrative, and social unification of the country. After numerous such attempts on his part had yielded no results, the United States Commander finally recommended that the problem be dealt with at a higher level.

On December 27, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, then meeting in Moscow, concluded an agreement, which it was hoped would provide a basis for the resolution of existing problems in Korea and for the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state. That agreement, which received the adherence also of the Chinese Government, called for direct negotiations between United States and Soviet representatives in Korea with a view to the setting up of a provisional government in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. It would take too much of your time to discuss the details of the alternating periods of hope and disappointment which lasted throughout the next two years. The record is clear and has been published. The United States maintained consistently the right of all Korean parties and organizations to participate in the talks without restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression. Our only condition was an indication of their willingness to cooperate with the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission set up by the Moscow agreement to conduct the negotiations. The Soviets, in spite of assur-

ances to the contrary, would only permit the participation of Koreans on terms which would have assured the domination of a pro-Communist minority of the Korean people. This, we would not allow.

When it became apparent that bilateral negotiations could not bring the Korean people any nearer their promised independence, this government took the initiative in proposing that the Four Powers adhering to the Moscow agreement on Korea—the United Kingdom, China, U.S.S.R., and United States—meet in Washington to consider methods by which Korean independence could be secured, to which end the United States Government presented a 7-point proposal as a basis of discussion. The United Kingdom and China accepted the invitation—the U.S.S.R. did not. Korea remained divided—the Korean people were still not independent. In these circumstances the United States took the only course open. It presented the problem of Korea for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As General Marshall said at that time, "We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence."

The General Assembly of United Nations by an overwhelming majority adopted on November 14, 1947, a resolution establishing a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and calling for an election under its observation to choose a representative National Assembly which should be responsible for drafting a democratic constitution and establishing a national government. This election was held on May 10, 1948, but was confined to south Korea alone because the U.S.S.R., in complete disregard of the expressed will of the United Nations, refused to allow the United Nations Temporary Commission access to north Korea. Having thus denied the people of north Korea an opportunity to express their will in a national election by secret ballot, the Soviets in their zone of occupation proceeded with the establishment of a Communist-dominated puppet government.

The May 10, 1948 election was the first occasion in the long history of Korea on which the Korean people had been given the opportunity freely to choose their own government, and the people of south Korea responded enthusiastically to this opportunity. Approximately 80 percent of the eligible voters registered, and an estimated 92.5 percent of these went to the polls and cast their ballots in an election which, despite the disruptive tactics of the Communists, was characterized by every mark of public order, approval, and enthusiasm.

The Government of the Republic of Korea which resulted from this election was formally inaugurated on August 15, 1948. The United

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States terminated its military government on the same date and soon thereafter in consonance with the United Nations resolution of November 14, began a substantial reduction in its occupation forces.

The third session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris in the fall of 1948 considered the report of its Temporary Commission which had observed the elections held in south Korea and had witnessed the emergence of the Government of the Republic. On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution which declared in part—

that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

This resolution further provided for the establishment of a re-constituted seven-nation United Nations Commission on Korea to work for the unification of Korea and the further development of representative government in that country, and otherwise to promote "the full accomplishment of the objectives set forth in the Resolution of November 14, 1947." This Commission has been in south Korea since January, but has not as yet been successful in obtaining permission to enter north Korea.

This further consideration of the Korean question by the General Assembly offered the U.S.S.R. yet another opportunity to abandon its unilateral course. It did not choose to do so. Instead it insisted that the Communist regime which it has fostered unilaterally in north Korea should be accepted as the government for the whole of Korea. Finding the General Assembly unimpressed by this argument, the Soviet bloc opposed the December 12 resolution which was approved with virtual unanimity by the other member nations.

The resolution of December 12, 1948, also recommended that member states, in establishing their relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into consideration the facts quoted above relating to the status of that government. In consonance with this provision the United States, on January 1, 1949, extended full recognition to the Republic of Korea. The United States has been joined in such recognition by China, France, Great Britain, and the Philippine Republic.

But political recognition is not enough. A government if it is to survive must rest on a solid economic base. The call of Communism can not compete with the sound of people going to and from productive work, which brings them a decent living and some hope for the future. And this

requires raw materials, machinery, and trained leaders to direct operations. The division of Korea as the result of Soviet obstructionism separated the industrial north from the agricultural south and this, added to the other dislocations of the war, caused serious economic distress among the 20 million Koreans in the United States zone. It has therefore been necessary for the United States to carry on a program of basic economic assistance. Until recently this program was carried on by the Department of the Army, but on January 1, 1949, its administration and necessary funds were transferred to the Economic Cooperation Administration under the authority of Public Law 793. The funds so transferred however, will enable the program of economic assistance so vitally needed by the Korean people to continue only until July 1, 1949.

Mr. Hoffman will discuss with you the economic situation in Korea and the urgent need of the Republic for economic assistance. I shall not go into that aspect of the matter except to indicate that the economy of south Korea now falls tragically short of being self-supporting even at the present modest standard of living. Without a continuation for the present of outside assistance, not only for essential relief, but also to help the Korean people to bring themselves closer to a level of economic self-support, the Korean economy will suffer a rapid and inevitable collapse. Under such circumstances only the Communists would win.

The people of Korea understand the conditions which confront them and realize that they must continue to ask for assistance for a period until they can stand on their own feet. Through their government they have many times expressed their gratitude to the United States for the aid which it has already given them—both political and economic. They have now asked the United States for a continuation of assistance in the vital period ahead.

If the United States is to continue to aid Korea, it should do so through the kind of program which will be most effective in reaching the policy objectives of the United States in Korea and economically least burdensome to the United States.

In order to become substantially self-supporting Korea, as Mr. Hoffman and his associates will show you in detail, must make basic investments in capital equipment for coal, electric power, and commercial fertilizer production, and for transportation.

Under present conditions in Korea, these investments can be provided only through a program of capital assistance by the United States. Without it, no matter how long relief is continued, it will be known to the people of both south and north Korea that the economy of south Korea is not becoming self-supporting and must depend upon outside assistance for its survival. Since there is no immediate hope for a large income for south Korea from exports, the withdrawal of

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assistance at any time before south Korea has become able to meet its basic requirements for coal, power, and fertilizer from internal sources would result in an increasing balance of payments deficit or progressive lowering of the standard of living. Under such circumstances there would appear to be little prospect that the Republic of Korea could ever provide the firm nucleus of self-sustaining political and economic stability so essential to any ultimate unification of the country on a democratic basis.

A modest capital equipment program will be the most economical form of assistance. The ECA's estimates show that a comparatively small amount of capital assistance in addition to basic relief would lay the foundation for a progressive reduction of the present high annual deficit. With the success of such a program the Koreans would be able to supply most of their basic needs for coal, electric power, and fertilizer production and, with the possibility of some private investment as the economy becomes more stabilized, the need for outside assistance could either be ended entirely or reduced considerably. On the other hand, mere relief without the investment necessary for recovery would not make possible any progress toward self-support and, unless continued indefinitely at a high rate, would, as I have already pointed out, leave the Republic in a condition in which it might collapse at any time should aid be withdrawn.

Should the unification of Korea on a non-Communist, democratic basis become an accomplished fact at an early date, thus enabling the country to reintegrate its economy, it is likely that the united country could become self-sustaining with less assistance and in a shorter time. It would be ill-advised, however, on the basis of the record I have outlined, to plan at this time on a basis other than the stern realities we now face. In any event, virtually all assistance proposed for the Republic would contribute usefully to the economy of the united country.

For four years this government has taken the lead among the great powers in an effort to bring to the Korean people the independence promised them at Cairo. Our success has been limited. An independent united Korea does not yet exist. A representative government has been elected in southern Korea, where we see the beginnings of a modern democratic state which, if allowed to survive, will be another example of a free nation to which millions in this important part of the world may look for inspiration. Conscious of its responsibilities as a former occupying power and in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which were initiated by the United States, the United States has been doing all in its power to assist the young Republic. In addition to economic assistance, our military authorities have participated in the training of the Korean government's security forces,

and as our own troops have progressively been withdrawn, they have left behind substantial quantities of equipment for the Korean forces.

This is in consonance with the recommendation in the General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, providing for the formation of Korean security forces and the withdrawal of the occupying powers. While our remaining occupation forces will shortly be withdrawn there will be retained in Korea a substantial military advisory group to continue training the Koreans so that they will be in a position to handle internal security problems and resist outside pressure of less magnitude than military aggression by a major power. But a sound economy is the basis of military as well as political strength. The Korean Government cannot maintain a force able to insure internal order without a viable economy.

The rest of Asia is watching us in Korea. Here in vivid contrast to the conditions found by many other peoples is a representative government, openly established under the general guidance of the free nations of the world associated in the United Nations, face to face with a regime set up in secret and maintained in secret in defiance of the United Nations. If we do not do all in our power, consistent with our world-wide obligations, to assist this outpost of freedom so that it will have an opportunity to survive, countless millions of the peoples of Asia will begin to doubt the practical superiority of democratic principles. By helping the Korean people to attain a stable economy on which to build a free and democratic government, we will encourage millions of peoples in the East to retain their present faith in democracy and the principles for which America stands. If we fail we will provide a rallying cry by which the Communist leaders in all countries from Japan to India will attract more and more people to their cause.

Unfortunately, I cannot assure you that approval of the present legislation will guarantee the survival of the Korean Republic and the achievement of our objective of a truly free and independent Korea. I can only say that disapproval of this program or an inadequate approach to the problem involved will guarantee failure. With the approval of this program, there is hope—without it, there is despair. In the light of present world conditions we cannot afford to risk return to despair.

Korean Military Advisory Group Established

[Released to the press June 8]

The following is the text of a letter of May 2, 1949 to the President of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, from Ambassador John J. Muccio concerning the establishment of a United States Military Advisory Group in Korea:

I have the honor to refer to your request for a United States military and naval mission and to recent references thereto in our discussions looking

towards setting a date for the early withdrawal of United States occupation forces.

As you know, there has been in existence on a provisional basis for more than eight months a United States military mission known as the Provisional Military Advisory Group whose function it has been to advise and assist the Korean Government in the development and training of its own security forces. It is the judgment of my Government that, due in no small part to the spirit of eager cooperation which has been shown by the Korean Government and its responsible officials, the work of the Provisional Military Advisory Group has contributed significantly to raising the capabilities of the security forces of the Republic of Korea. This judgment would seem to be substantiated by your own recent statement to the effect that Korean defense forces are now rapidly approaching the point at which our security can be assured, provided the Republic of

Korea is not called upon to face attack from foreign sources.

In order to assure the continuance of this progress without further dependence upon the presence of United States occupation forces in Korea, my Government has decided to establish an augmented Korean Military Advisory Group to function as a part of the American Mission in Korea, with responsibility for the training mission heretofore undertaken by the Provisional Military Advisory Group. Under my overall direction as Ambassador, the Korean Military Advisory Group will be headed by Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, presently Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, and Commanding Officer of the Provisional Military Advisory Group. Further details concerning the composition of the new Military Advisory Group will be discussed at an appropriate time with the proper officials of your Government.

North Atlantic Treaty

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS¹

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the North Atlantic Treaty (Executive L, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, unanimously report the treaty to the Senate and recommend that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

PART II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE TREATY

The treaty establishes a collective defense arrangement for the North Atlantic area within the framework of the United Nations Charter and based upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter. In many respects it is similar to and patterned upon the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

The 12 signatories of the treaty are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The treaty is subject to review at any time after 10 years and any party may cease to be a party after 20 years; otherwise it is of indefinite duration.

General objectives of the treaty

The primary objective of the treaty is to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear the determination of the parties collectively to resist armed attack upon any of them.

It is designed to strengthen the system of law based upon the purposes and principles of the

United Nations. It should go far to remove any uncertainty which might mislead potential aggressors as to the determination of the parties fully to carry out their obligations under the Charter and collectively to resist an armed attack.

The security of the North Atlantic area is vital to the national security of the United States and of key importance to world peace and security. The peoples of the North Atlantic area are linked together not only by the interdependence of their security but by a common heritage and civilization and devotion to their free institutions, based upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It is this common heritage and civilization and these free institutions which the signatories are determined to defend.

The treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future.

Although it is intended that the general machinery and procedures provided in the Charter

¹ Excerpts from S. Exec. Rept. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., June 6, 1949.

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would be utilized in cases of disputes between the signatories, the treaty can of course be used as a regional arrangement under the United Nations for dealing with such matters as are appropriate for regional action within the meaning of chapter VIII of the Charter.

The obligations of national defense and advancing the welfare of its people are inherent in any government. The obligations to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force, expressly reaffirmed in the treaty, were undertaken by this Government when it ratified the United Nations Charter.

New obligations

The new obligations undertaken by the United States in the treaty are—

1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, the individual and collective capacity of the parties to resist armed attack (art. 3);

2. To consult whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of them is threatened (art. 4);

3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in the North Atlantic area an attack against them all (art. 5); and

4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as the United States deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (art. 5).

The treaty provides for a council and such subsidiary agencies as may be necessary, including a defense committee, to assist the parties in giving effect to the treaty.

Safeguards

The treaty in letter and in spirit is purely defensive. It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression.

The treaty expressly provides that all of its provisions must be carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the parties.

The provisions of the treaty are expressly subordinated to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter. The provisions of the Charter, wherever applicable, control every activity undertaken under the treaty.

PART III. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION²

PREAMBLE

The purposes and spirit of the treaty

The preamble states clearly and simply the purpose, intent, and spirit of the treaty. The committee endorses

this declaration, which is formal recognition of the common interests, developing unity, and increasing interdependence of the North Atlantic community.

It should be emphasized, however, that the preamble is no expression of narrow regionalism for the members' will to live in peace is "with all peoples and all governments"—the primary purpose of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, peace, stability, and well-being in the North Atlantic area are of universal advantage in the cause of peace.

ARTICLE 1.—PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

In this article the members of the pact reaffirm the solemn obligations which they have accepted under the United Nations Charter to settle all their international disputes by peaceful means. The committee is convinced that the entire text of the treaty, and particularly this article, makes abundantly clear the will of the signatories for peace and their desire to threaten no one.

By becoming parties to the treaty, countries which are not members of the United Nations, such as Italy and Portugal, accept the obligations set forth in article 2 of the Charter to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

ARTICLE 2.—DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS

Article 2 is a reaffirmation of faith. It demonstrates the conviction of the parties that peace is positive and dynamic, that real peace is far more than the mere absence of war. The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being, and encourage economic collaboration.

The unilateral undertaking of the parties to "strengthen their free institutions" recognizes that free institutions have succumbed in many places of the world and that eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty. The effort to secure "better understanding" of the principles upon which these institutions are based is a positive appreciation of the role of public opinion, both among the signatories and throughout the world. Free nations must take affirmative measures to this end, rather than resort to censorship or iron curtains. The gospel of freedom can best be spread by example.

The committee supports these objectives as desirable goals to be sought by the signatory parties. It believes that their progressive attainment will contribute to stability, well-being and real peace.

No legislative action required

Considerable attention has been given by the committee to the question whether article 2, in stating these objectives, imposes on the United States any obligation to take specific legislative action. Would the references to "strengthening free institutions" and "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies," for example, mean that we would be obligated to enact additional legislation relating to civil rights, the reduction of tariffs, and similar matters?

The committee is completely satisfied that this article involves no obligation on us to take any legislative action

² For text of the treaty see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 339, or Department of State publication 3464.

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whatsoever. In fact, no such obligations were contemplated by the negotiators and no new machinery is envisaged for these purposes under the treaty. The article does, however, provide encouragement for individual or bilateral action or action through such existing agencies as the United Nations, the Brussels pact, and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation.

The committee finds no implication whatever in article 2 that the United States could be called upon under the treaty to contribute toward a long-term recovery program for Europe.

ARTICLE 3—SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID

Article 3 embodies in the treaty the principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid established by Senate Resolution 239 as a prerequisite to United States association in any collective defense arrangement. This principle has formed the basis of the European recovery program. In both cases the committee is convinced that the greater the degree of coordination achieved the greater will be the results at the least cost to each participant. The committee also wishes to emphasize that under this principle each participant must do its utmost to help itself and its share to help the others. There are no free rides. A definite obligation is undertaken by each party to contribute, individually and collectively, to the defense of the North Atlantic area.

It has been suggested in some quarters that article 3 might be interpreted in such a way as to provide the basis for an armaments race. The committee rejects any such interpretation. Capacity to resist armed attack includes all elements, including economic strength, and is relative to the degree of danger and the strength of potential aggressors. If the treaty and the United Nations are successful in providing substantially increased security, it should be possible to have greater capacity to resist armed attack with smaller military forces. The essential objective is increased security, not increased military strength.

Questions have also been raised as to whether the United States, under article 3, would be obligated to assist the other parties to develop the capacity of their overseas territories to resist armed attack. The objective of the treaty is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. During the negotiations there were no suggestions that this article should be interpreted as applying to any other area. The United States is under no obligation to assist the other parties in building up military establishments for use in their overseas territories, nor to engage in resisting armed attack outside the area defined in article 6.

The committee calls attention to the fact that the United States stands to gain great benefits from the principle of "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Implementation of this principle will not only help deter aggression but will go far, in the event all the efforts of the parties for peace should fail, to assure the successful defense of the United States and the collective strength essential for victory.

ARTICLE 4—CONSULTATION

In article 4 the parties undertake to consult whenever any party so requests on the basis that the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of them is threatened. A situation arising anywhere might be cause for consultation, provided that it constituted a threat to one or more of the parties and might involve obligations under the treaty. The committee underlines the fact that consultation could be requested only when the element of threat is present and expresses the opinion that this limitation should be strictly interpreted.

Many well-known techniques have been developed whereby internal disorders or coups are deliberately engineered by outside powers to further their own interests. Accordingly, consultation might also be sought under article 4 in the case of an internal disorder where circumstances indicated that such disorder was being aided and abetted by assistance from outside the country affected.

Article 4 carries no obligation other than that of consultation. Whether or not any action was taken following consultation, or what form such action might take, would be matters for each party to decide for itself. It should be emphasized, however, that in no event is collective enforcement action, such as that defined in articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, contemplated.

Use of United Nations machinery

The committee is confident that the framers of the Atlantic Pact did not intend that article 4 should infringe upon the efficacy of United Nations machinery or in any way impair its usefulness. Clearly there should be no duplication of United Nations machinery. It is the opinion of the committee that consultation under article 4 should not be sought unless the United Nations for some reason is prevented from dealing with the situation giving rise for consultation. The committee wishes to emphasize this view since it has consistently supported the United Nations as the cornerstone of American foreign relations, and would be loath to see any action taken not entirely in harmony with this policy.

ARTICLE 5—ACTION IN THE EVENT OF ARMED ATTACK

Article 5 is the heart of the treaty. In it the parties establish the principle that an armed attack against one or more of them is to be considered an attack against them all. In accepting this principle, the committee believes that the United States is acting on the basis of a realization brought about by its experience in two world wars that an armed attack in the North Atlantic area is in effect an attack on itself. The solemn acceptance of this principle by all the parties should have a powerful deterring effect on any would-be aggressor by making clear to him in advance that his attack would be met by the combined resistance of all the nations in the North Atlantic Pact.

Determination whether attack has occurred.

The committee notes that article 5 would come into operation only when a nation had committed an international crime by launching an armed attack against a party to the treaty. The first question which would arise would be whether or not an armed attack had in fact occurred. If the circumstances were not clear, there would presumably be consultation but each party would have the responsibility of determining for itself the answer to this question of fact.

"Such action as it deems necessary"

The second problem is the nature and extent of the action contemplated as a result of armed attack. The action specified is that deemed necessary "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The committee emphasizes that this clearly does not commit any of the parties to declare war. Depending upon the gravity of the attack, there are numerous measures short of the use of armed force which might be sufficient to deal with the situation. Such measures could involve anything from a diplomatic protest to the most severe forms of pressure.

In this connection, the committee calls particular attention to the phrase "such action as it deems necessary." These words were included in article 5 to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its honest judgment in deciding upon the measures it will take to

help restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The freedom of decision as to what action each party shall take in no way reduces the importance of the commitment undertaken. Action short of the use of armed force might suffice, or total war with all our resources might be necessary. Obviously article 5 carries with it an important and far-reaching commitment for the United States; what we may do to carry out that commitment, however, will depend upon our own independent decision in each particular instance reached in accordance with our own constitutional processes.

President and Congress

The answer to both these questions is "No." An armed attack upon any State of the United States by its very nature would require the immediate application of all force necessary to repel the attack. The Constitution itself recognizes the special significance of such a calamity by providing that the United States shall protect each State against invasion. Similarly, the government of any nation party to the treaty would feel itself under obligation and under imminent physical need to give the highest priority to essential countermeasures to meet an armed attack upon its own homeland.

In the event any party to the treaty were attacked the obligation of the United States Government would be to decide upon and take forthwith the measures it deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The measures which would be necessary to accomplish that end would depend upon a number of factors, including the location, nature, scale, and significance of the attack. The decision as to what action was necessary, and the action itself, would of course have to be taken in accordance with established constitutional procedures as the treaty in article 11 expressly requires.

Article 5 records what is a fact, namely, that an armed attack within the meaning of the treaty would in the present-day world constitute an attack upon the entire community comprising the parties to the treaty, including the United States. Accordingly, the President and the Congress, within their sphere of assigned constitutional responsibilities, would be expected to take all action necessary and appropriate to protect the United States against the consequences and dangers of an armed attack committed against any party to the Treaty. The committee does not believe it appropriate in this report to undertake to define the authority of the President to use the armed forces. Nothing in the treaty, however, including the provision that an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all, increases or decreases the constitutional powers of either the President or the Congress or changes the relationship between them.

Duration of action

Measures may be taken under article 5 only when an armed attack has occurred and must be terminated whenever the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Thus action under article 5 will never be necessary unless the Security Council has been unable to meet its responsibilities and must cease whenever the Security Council has regained control of the situation. The treaty, like article 51 of the Charter, provides insurance against a situation which the Security Council is unable to control. The committee is convinced that the treaty, in making clear that an aggressor could not profit from such a situation, provides a valuable supplement to the Charter in reducing the possibility that it might arise.

ARTICLE 6—DESCRIPTION OF NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Article 6 specifies the area within which an armed attack would bring the provisions of article 5 into operation. Thus, the obligations under article 5 are strictly limited to the area described.

The word "area" is intended to cover the general region, rather than merely the North Atlantic Ocean in a narrow sense, and includes the western part of the Mediterranean as well as the North Sea and most of the Gulf of Mexico. Western Europe faces on the Atlantic even if all the nations of the western European community do not.

In view of the purpose of the treaty to deter armed attack, the area covered by the treaty was deliberately described in general terms rather than defined by lines on a map. The committee agrees that this general description is preferable, for it would seem inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty to provide that article 5 would come into operation in the event of an attack, for example, upon ships or aircraft at a given point but not if the attack occurred a few miles away. If there should be any doubt as to whether or not an armed attack has taken place within the area specified in the treaty, each party would decide for itself, in the light of the facts surrounding the particular situation and the significance of the attack.

Not applicable to overseas territories

The committee wishes to emphasize the fact that article 5 would not apply to any of the overseas territories outside the North Atlantic area as described in article 6. The three Algerian departments of France (which constitute only a small part of the total territory of Algeria) are an integral part of metropolitan France under the French Constitution and are not overseas possessions. The only outlying territories covered are the islands in the North Atlantic area, Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and the islands of the Canadian Arctic.

ARTICLE 7—PARAMOUNT AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Lest there be any misunderstanding about the relative position of the treaty and the United Nations Charter, article 7 makes clear the overriding character of the Charter with respect to the obligations of the signatories who are also members of the United Nations. This principle is in accordance with the provisions of article 103 of the Charter which stipulates that—

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

The provisions of the Charter thus govern, wherever they may be applicable, any activities undertaken under the treaty.

The Charter also bestows upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the opinion of the committee the treaty rightly recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council in this field and makes clear the intent of the signatories not to compete with this responsibility or interfere with it in any way.

This desire not to compete with or impair the authority of the United Nations is applicable not only to the Security Council but to other organs of the United Nations, which, the committee understands, the parties intend to use wherever appropriate.

ARTICLE 8—POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH OTHER TREATIES

Article 8 is designed to make perfectly clear that none of the existing international engagements of any of the signatories is in conflict with the provisions of the treaty. Each signatory has solemnly declared that in fact there is no conflict and that, in effect, they have no commit-

ments which would prevent them from carrying out their obligations under the pact. The committee sees no reason why the United States Government should question the validity of this declaration by the signatories.

Italian peace treaty

The committee also examined the terms of the Italian peace treaty, which limit the size of the Italian armed forces and the extent to which rearmament will be possible. Given these limitations the question naturally arises as to whether Italy could live up to her obligations under article 3 of the Atlantic Pact to develop her capacity to resist armed attack. The matter is adequately disposed of by the following statement supplied for the record by the State Department:

It is understood by all parties to the treaty that the participation of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact has no effect on the military provisions, or any other provisions, of the Italian peace treaty. Any contribution which Italy makes to the collective capacity for defense of the North Atlantic area must be within the limits fixed by the military provisions of the Italian peace treaty.

ARTICLE 9—ORGANIZATION UNDER THE TREATY

While some machinery is clearly necessary for the effective implementation of the treaty, it would be inadvisable to attempt to elaborate this machinery in detail in the treaty. On the contrary, it is preferable that the machinery be described only in broad outline in order that the specific organization may be evolved in the light of need and experience. The committee urges that the organization set up be as simple as possible consistent with its function of assisting implementation of the treaty and that maximum use be made of existing organizations.

It should be emphasized, however, that the responsibility for making decisions lies in the respective governments rather than in the council. Since the council will have only advisory powers, no voting procedure is needed or contemplated. No party will have a veto, nor can it be coerced into taking a decision against its own judgment.

ARTICLE 10—NEW MEMBERS

Senate action necessary on new members

Inasmuch as the admission of new members might radically alter our obligations under the pact, the committee examined article 10 very carefully. The question arose whether any United States decision respecting new members would be based solely on Presidential action or would require Senate approval. Consequently, the committee was fully satisfied by the commitment of the President, delivered by the Secretary of State, that he would consider the admission of a new member to the pact as the conclusion of a new treaty with that member and would seek the advice and consent of the Senate to each such admission. The committee considers this an obligation binding upon the Presidential office.

Spain and Germany

The signatory countries did not invite Spain to participate though it is recognized that Spain is strategically important to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Whether Spain will be invited to participate at a later date will depend upon the unanimous decision of the parties.

So many imponderables affect the current position of Germany, which is still under military occupation, that in the negotiations extensive consideration was not given to the inclusion of western Germany. Presumably, Germany will be reunited one day, but time is required so that the German people may prove their attachment to the principles of the treaty. Meanwhile, it should be noted

that Germany receives some protection since the treaty covers armed attack upon the occupation forces.

ARTICLE 11—CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

The committee and the Senate, in Senate Resolution 239, attached great importance to assuring that any such agreement as the pact would not only be ratified in accordance with the "respective constitutional processes" of the signatory nations, but also that all its provisions would be carried out under the same constitutional safeguards. Constitutional processes for giving effect to the will of the people are the very essence of democracy and it is only through wide popular support that the treaty can be given the strength and vitality necessary to assure its success.

The committee wishes to emphasize the fact that the protective clause "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes" was placed in article 11 in order to leave no doubt that it applies not only to article 5, for example, but to every provision in the treaty. The safeguard is thus all-inclusive.

The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war.

Except for the proposed foreign military assistance program, no legislation related to the treaty is presently contemplated or considered necessary.

Effectiveness of the democratic process

It has been questioned whether a treaty subordinating action to the constitutional processes of 12 democratic nations offers sufficient certainty and immediacy of action effectively to deter aggression. The committee is convinced that it does. The expression of the will of a whole people offers far more certainty than any commitment by a dictator. The action of the democracies in the past great war is concrete evidence of their ability to act with the necessary speed in the event of an emergency.

ARTICLE 12—REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY

The treaty takes into account the processes of peaceful change and the need for flexibility in a rapidly changing world by providing that its terms may be reviewed at any time after it has been in force 10 years. Of course, earlier review is possible by unanimous consent. For purposes of review, the signatories will take into account the factors affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area. The committee draws particular attention to the explicit reference that developments in the United Nations, including universal as well as regional arrangements, will figure significantly among such factors.

Apart from the general review contemplated in article 12 the treaty makes no provision for particular amendments. If such amendments were advanced, they would require the unanimous approval of the signatory states. In our own case the advice and consent of the Senate would be required. The committee believes that the interests of the United States would be amply protected by these safeguards.

ARTICLE 13—DURATION OF TREATY

This article provides that after the treaty has been in effect for 20 years any party may cease to be a party 1 year after notice of denunciation has been given. There is no provision for individual members to withdraw prior to that time.

The committee gave serious thought to the problems involved in the duration of the treaty. In view of the difficulties of forecasting developments in the international situation in the distant future, rigidity for too long a time clearly would be undesirable. On the other hand, the committee agrees that the stability and confidence which are so essential for the security of the North Atlantic area could not adequately be established if the treaty were of short duration. It accepts as a desirable solution, therefore, the indefinite duration of the treaty, with provision for review after 10 years, and for withdrawal after 20 years.

ARTICLE 14—AUTHENTICITY OF TEXTS

Article 14 is a formal article concerning the equal authenticity of the English and French texts which have been found to be identical in meaning. Each text being equally authentic, as is the case with any treaty done in more than one language, neither prevails over the other; and any differences in interpretation which might arise would have to be settled by negotiation.

3. COMPARISON OF TREATY WITH OLD-FASHIONED MILITARY ALLIANCES

Some confusion may have arisen in the public mind due to the allegations of certain critics that the treaty is an "old-fashioned military alliance" of the type which Washington warned against in his Farewell Address. In the past, military alliances have varied widely in both their language and their intent. On the surface, at least, many of them were purely defensive in nature. The committee believes, however, that in actuality the present treaty is fundamentally different from the old-fashioned alliances which characterized European diplomacy during past centuries.

Some of these alliances constituted automatic commitments to go to war in the event the other parties became involved. The Holy Alliance, for example, provided that the parties "will on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance." Some of them were personal agreements concluded between kings or emperors who were often related to each other. Many of them were kept secret and often those which were made public were accompanied by secret understandings, with aggression and national aggrandizement in the minds of the signatories if not in the actual texts of the treaties. Most of them were limited to two or three parties.

The present treaty avoids all these undesirable aspects. Its entry into force and its execution depends upon the continuing support of the people of the signatory states given through their democratic constitutional processes. Moreover, it has been conceived within the framework of the United Nations Charter with all the solemn obligations against aggressive action which that document imposes upon its members. Finally, in both intent and language, it is purely defensive in nature. It comes into operation only against a nation which, by its own action, has proved itself an international criminal by violating the Charter and

attacking a party to the treaty. It continues in operation only until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain peace and security. If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against war itself.

6. THE TREATY AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The committee did not consider in detail the military assistance program since legislation dealing with that matter has not yet been submitted to the Congress. It is understood, however, that the President will soon recommend legislation authorizing the transfer of military equipment and assistance to the Atlantic Pact signatories. The proposed program will request \$1,130,000,000 for members of the Atlantic Pact and approximately \$320,000,000 for other countries, including Greece and Turkey, making a total of \$1,450,000,000 for the fiscal year 1950.

Whether approval of the treaty by the United States would constitute any kind of commitment to support the military-assistance program was discussed at considerable length during the hearings. Clearly the ratification of the treaty would commit the United States to the principle expressed in article 3, namely, to maintain and develop the individual and collective capacity of the signatories to resist armed attack "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." It is equally clear, however, that article 3 does not bind the United States to accept the proposed military-assistance program or, for that matter, any particular kind of implementation program. It does bind our Government, as well as the other signatory governments, to the general principle of self-help and mutual aid. Each member of the pact will have to exercise its own honest judgment as to what steps it should take to give effect to this principle.

The State Department has assured the committee that during the negotiations no commitments of any kind were made by the United States to furnish military assistance. The European negotiators were constantly reminded that the implementation of article 3 by the United States would depend upon congressional action. While they were told that the administration intended to introduce legislation authorizing the transfer of military equipment, at the same time they were repeatedly warned that no assurances whatsoever could be given as to whether or not, in what form or in what amounts, such legislation would be approved.

With these factors in mind the committee agrees that the treaty and the military-assistance program should be considered separately by the Congress, each on its own merits. The committee further agrees that a member of the Senate might vote for the treaty and still find valid reasons for

opposing the program of implementation recommended by the administration. During the hearings several members of the committee publicly announced that their support for the pact did not necessarily mean they were going to approve the military-assistance program.

On this point the following statement of Secretary Acheson, as he testified before the committee, is pertinent:

The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist the other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties. I, therefore, earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military-assistance program.

PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. NEED FOR RATIFICATION

The committee believes that our failure to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty would have disastrous consequences abroad. At the present time there is an encouraging momentum of confidence that has been building up in Europe during the past year as a direct result of our interest and assistance. The failure of the political strikes in France, the Communist losses in the Italian and French elections in 1948 and 1949, the recent success of the French internal loan and the increased strength of the western European currencies generally, the recent agreements on Germany, and the success of the recovery program—all these things reflect this growing momentum.

The great retarding factor in the European situation has been the pervading sense of insecurity. This sense of insecurity has been lessened during the past year as a direct result of American interest in common security problems as demonstrated by the passage of Senate Resolution 239 and our willingness to negotiate and sign the North Atlantic Treaty. The decision on the part of some of the European nations, such as Norway and Denmark, to participate in the treaty was not taken without full regard for the risks inherent in making clear their determination to resist aggression.

The committee strongly believes that it would be in the best interests of the United States and indeed, the entire world, to sustain and encourage the momentum of confidence that has been building up in Europe, by ratifying the treaty at an early date.

2. SUMMARY OF REASONS COMMITTEE URGES RATIFICATION

On June 6 the committee unanimously agreed to report the treaty to the Senate for favorable action.

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Its reasons for recommending ratification include the following:

(1) The treaty should greatly increase the prospect that another war can be averted by making clear in advance the determination of these 12 nations of the North Atlantic area to throw their collective power and influence into the scales on the side of peace.

(2) It expresses in concrete terms the will of the American people, and the other peoples of the North Atlantic area, to work constantly to maintain peace and freedom.

(3) Since the course of action envisaged in the treaty is substantially that which the United States would follow without the treaty, there is great advantage to the United States and the entire world in making clear our intentions in advance.

(4) The treaty is expressly subordinated to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter and is designed to foster those conditions of peace and stability in the world which are essential if the United Nations is to function successfully.

(5) It is wholly consistent with our Constitution and stipulates that all its provisions shall be carried out in accordance with the constitutional processes of the participating countries.

(6) The treaty is in accordance with the basic interests of the United States, which should be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country.

(7) In strengthening the security of the North Atlantic area the treaty greatly increases the national security of the United States.

(8) It is strictly in accordance with the Senate's recommendation, expressed last year in Senate Resolution 239, that the United States should associate itself with collective defense arrangements and thus contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to defend itself against any armed attack affecting its national security.

(9) The treaty will greatly increase the determination of the North Atlantic states to resist aggression and their confidence that they can successfully do so.

(10) It will free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress.

(11) By encouraging this feeling of confidence and security it should eventually make possible substantial savings for the United States both in connection with the European recovery program and our domestic Military Establishment.

(12) The treaty is essential to the development of that degree of unity and security among the North Atlantic states which will make possible

the reintegration of Germany into western Europe and the ultimate solution of the German problem.

(13) It will greatly stimulate the efforts of the North Atlantic states to help themselves and to help each other and, through proper coordination of these efforts, to achieve maximum benefits with minimum costs and bring far greater strength than could be achieved by each acting alone.

(14) In the event our efforts for peace are undermined and war is imposed upon us, the treaty assures us that 11 other nations will stand with us to defend our freedom and our civilization.

(15) The treaty is not confined to the prevention of war but reflects the will of the participating nations to strengthen the moral and material foundations of lasting peace and freedom.

In tendering this unanimous report on the North Atlantic Treaty, we do so in furtherance of our Nation's most precious heritage—shared in common with the other signatories—continuing faith in our dependence upon Almighty God and His guidance in the affairs of men and nations.

British Ambassador Deposits Ratification of North Atlantic Treaty

Exchange of Remarks Between Ambassador Franks and Acting Secretary Webb

[Released to the press June 7]

The following is the text of remarks made by the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, upon the occasion of the deposit of the United Kingdom instrument of ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and the reply of Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb.

Remarks by Sir Oliver Franks

I have been instructed by Mr. Bevin to hand to you the instrument of ratification by His Majesty the King of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington two months ago.

The United Kingdom Parliament voted in favor of ratifying the Treaty by an overwhelming majority. In so doing, Parliament expressed the conviction of the British people that the North Atlantic Treaty is a major contribution to world peace and that its early entry into force will add greatly to the general stability and security. The British people are determined to play their part as loyal members of the North Atlantic community in the defense of democracy, as is indeed already shown by the steps which they are taking in conjunction with their fellow members of the Brussels Treaty, and to take their full share in the responsibilities which the Treaty places upon its Signa-

tories. They do so in the firm belief that in present circumstances the Treaty provides the best guarantee for future peace.

Reply by Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb

Mr. Ambassador, this instrument of ratification will be deposited in the Archives of the United States with the original of the North Atlantic Treaty, and this Government will inform the other Signatories that it has been deposited.

"I should like to pay tribute to the people of the United Kingdom, who have always done their utmost in the interests of preserving freedom and a democratic way of life. Their steadfastness in serving the cause of peace once again has been demonstrated by the ratification of this Treaty.

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42. E/1334: Report of the International Refugee Organization, to be distributed on 28 May 1949
43. Council resolution 171 (VII)
E/1318: Report of the Secretary-General on relations with inter-governmental organizations, distributed on 26 April 1949, E/1318/Corr.1 and E/1318/Corr.2
44. Reports to be distributed after the meetings of the Committee to convene on 4 July at Geneva and, if required, during the session
45. Council resolution 131 (VI)
E/1322: report of the Secretary-General distributed on 23 May 1949; E/1322/Add.1 and E/1322/Add.2, to be distributed in the first half of June.
46. Council resolution 205 (VIII)
Report of the Secretary-General to be distributed on 27 May 1949
47. At its meeting of 13 April 1949, the Interim Committee on Programme of Meetings agreed to consider in the latter part of May a preliminary draft calendar of conferences for 1950 (E/C.4/SR.13)
48. General Assembly resolution 207 (III)
Council resolution 199 (VIII)
See document E/INF.21/Rev.2 for terms of office of members of Commissions
49. E/1332: Communication from the World Federation of Trade Unions, distributed on 19 May 1949; additional documentation to be received from the World Federation of Trade Unions.
50. Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council
Note by the Secretary-General to be distributed
51. Document to be distributed during the Council session
52. Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure

Accomplishments of Institute of Inter-American Affairs

STATEMENT BY WILLARD L. THORP¹

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs

The proposed legislation for continuing and expanding the activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs is directly in line with our foreign policy, particularly as it relates to cooperation with the other American Republics.

The activities of the Institute are based on technical and scientific cooperation with other nations of this hemisphere to strengthen the foundations of their freedom and ours.

What our country has to contribute to this common objective, more significant than money or material resources, is the technical knowledge and skill we have gained in the course of our own development. The programs of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs are developmental programs in which technicians from the United States work abroad with the technicians of the cooperating countries to increase the productivity of the farmers, wipe out disease, and to reduce ignorance.

The Congress has recognized, as have all who have been familiar with these cooperative programs, that they have been and are successful. I quote the following statement from the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which was incorporated in the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on the Institute of Inter-American Affairs Act of 1947.

Results achieved. The hearings brought out impressive evidence of the practicality of the accomplishments of the activities here under review. The programs aim to strengthen the bonds of friendship among the American Republics and to add to the foundation of democratic society . . . by concrete examples in the form of hospitals built, infested areas made healthful, undernourished segments of the populations brought to a proper diet standard, illiterate people provided with schools, and the like.

It was brought out that to date upward of 25,000,000 people in Latin America have received tangible, prized benefits through these cooperative efforts, which they regard as telling evidence of the good will of the people of the United States. Latin Americans consider them a conspicuously successful, desirable implementation of the good neighbor policy, in furtherance of the Inter-American political system. Each of the other participating governments has requested continuance of the programs and progressively increases the proportion of its contribution.

Through the benefits realized in thousands of communities by millions of the Latin Americans served by the programs, an appreciable impetus has been given toward raising consumer standards and in other ways as well, bringing home to the masses what democracy stands for and can do. The programs are recognized by Latin American statesmen and American diplomats as an effective instrument for strengthening democratic ideas and institutions and counteracting the spread of communism among the masses. They do this by demonstrating the practical capacity of democratic governments, aided by this form of

cooperation, to improve basic conditions of human life and successfully meet the challenge of totalitarian propaganda.

The success we have had with these programs may in part be attributed to the device of the cooperative *servicio*, as we call it. This is an administrative arrangement whereby a bureau or office, called *servicio*, is set up within the Ministry of Agriculture or Health or Education of the other government, generally under the direction of a United States technician paid by the Institute. This *servicio* is responsible to the minister and is staffed by United States and local technicians together. It operates with funds contributed in large part by the local government, in smaller part by the Institute, to a common pool. Our experience has been that our contribution to such a pool is essential to maintaining in practice the concept of partnership between governments. This partnership, in turn, has been successful in insuring the continuity of programs in spite of local political vicissitudes and local changes of administration.

These programs are, by their nature, long range. In the past 2 years the Institute has operated on a year-to-year basis, not knowing whether it would have funds to continue or whether it would have to liquidate its participation in these programs all over the hemisphere. If the decision of the Congress is to continue this activity, I am sure the Congress will want it continued in such a way that the relatively small amount of money involved can be spent with maximum effectiveness. This means that programs must be planned and agreements entered into for several years ahead. Let me quote a dispatch from our ambassador in Paraguay on this point. He writes as follows:

"The Embassy would like to emphasize the need for signing contracts with the Latin American Governments for as long periods as possible. Its realization of the need goes back to the experience during the last year when it was mandatory to obtain a contract for just twelve months. At that time neither the Department, IIAA, nor the Embassy knew whether it would be possible to operate these three organizations (conducting the health, agricultural and educational programs respectively) beyond June 30, 1949. This experience

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

showed the Embassy that it is a great deterrent if not an impossibility, for Paraguay (and, certainly, for the other Latin American countries) to maintain an interest in the work of these three agencies when it is being done on a year-to-year basis. The Government and officials of Paraguay need a longer period in order to budget and make arrangements for the funds for her contribution to the maintenance of the three agencies. On the other hand, if the political and governmental leaders of Paraguay can look ahead for a period of five or ten years of activity (for the three programs) they will be stimulated to plan and to obtain funds for Paraguayan cooperation in their work.

"It is equally as important to recall that the American personnel of these civilian missions are unable to plan and carry out the work to be done on a year-to-year basis. They must, if their work is to be effective, make plans on a longer range. Whether we consider the improvement of planting seed, the training of agricultural supervisors, instruction in public health, or education in plumbing, radio or auto mechanics, our Chiefs of Party must be able to plan for a period of more than twelve months.

"All that has been said above underlines the need of our agencies for long term contracts which Embassy experience has shown necessary. If five year contracts can be signed hereafter the people of the United States will get more value per dollar for money spent than it will be possible to obtain under shorter contracts, regardless of the effort spent by the Department, the IIAA, and the IIAA agencies."

The proposed legislation has been drawn up to meet the need outlined in the statement I have just quoted by enabling the Institute to plan and work on the basis of 3-to-5-year commitments.

To the extent that these programs realize their long-range objectives, they promote the economic and political stability of the countries that constitute our inter-American community. This means an expanding international trade. It means better markets for our products and more effective supplies for our needs. Incidentally, these programs have a direct effect in increasing the demand for particular United States products by introducing and demonstrating on a large scale the use of our agricultural machinery, our pharmaceuticals, hospital equipment, medical supplies, and so forth. Far more important, however, is the fact that by promoting conditions of economic health they strengthen the hemisphere of which we are a part and enable it better to withstand any aggression, direct or indirect, that might be launched against it. By helping our neighbors to help themselves, we are promoting the conditions that make inter-American cooperation in all fields more constructive and effective.

I had said that the programs are generally recognized as outstanding successes. Last August we

queried our ambassadors in the 16 countries where programs are now operative, and queried them in confidence, asking them to report whether and how the programs were assisting in implementing the foreign policy of the United States, whether the programs were building good will for the United States, and whether they ought to be extended. Now it is the business of our ambassadors to be critical where the national interest is not being served in a positive fashion, but the response in this case was uniformly favorable, and, I think I may say, generally enthusiastic.

Our ambassador to Bolivia wrote: "My own estimate of the value of the Institute's activities is a high one . . . I consider that the programs . . . are necessary in developing the mode of life that we desire to have in the Western Hemisphere . . ."

Our ambassador to Paraguay wrote: "I consider that the maintenance and continuance of all three programs (in food production, health and basic education) is essential to the development of our foreign policy in this country and that the work they are doing helps this Embassy immeasurably in carrying out its mission here. . . . To discontinue any one of these programs now would be to throw away many of the benefits already gained and to lose most of the investments which have been made . . ."

These quotations, of course, are representative of favorable reports. I cannot quote examples of unfavorable reports because there were none.

I have so far emphasized the positive benefits that result from the continuance of these programs. I am bound to call attention, as well, to the positive damage that would result if our country should suddenly withdraw from this cooperation. It would certainly be taken as evidence in support of the false charges that we have turned our backs on our sister republics in the hemisphere, that the good-neighbor policy has been a temporary expedient, and that our advocacy of inter-American cooperation has been cynical. We cannot possibly meet all the requests for assistance that come to us from our neighbors to the south, but we can continue and we can strengthen this kind of assistance, which consists in the application of our technical knowledge and our skills to their basic problems.

The work of the IIAA is in conformity with point 4 of the President's inaugural address, in which he stressed "making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

As you know, the Department of State was designated by the President as the agency responsible for developing plans to implement this objective. I expect that the results of the inter-departmental study that has been going forward under my direction will be submitted to the Congress by the President early next week. The work of the IIAA has been thoroughly reviewed, and

there is no question about the desirability of continuing this type of activity.

The IIAA and the projects it is carrying out have the earnest endorsement of the President, of the Department of State, and of our ambassadors, who speak at first hand for their effectiveness in the field. These are down-to-earth programs of constructive action. We request authorization of

the Congress to continue their development as important and integral aspects of our relations with our sister American Republics, and in accordance with the policy proclaimed by President Truman.

Dr. Dillon Myer, President of the Institute, is prepared to give you a full description of these projects and explanations of the proposed bill and to answer your questions in detail.

Iron Curtains

BY WILLARD L. THORP¹

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs

The Soviet Union is clearly trying to reduce its contact with the outside world to a minimum. At the moment, it maintains as far as possible a closed system. The iron curtain may not be as tangible as the Great Wall of China, but it is a much more effective barrier against outside influence.

The most obvious operation of the curtain is evident in the limited number of individuals who move across the border. Only a handful of foreigners obtain permission to enter Russia today, and as for Russians traveling outside, even the ambassadors do not keep their wives and children with them on their posts.

Nor have unofficial ambassadors been any more successful. Shortly after the end of the war, the Department of State invited the Soviet Union to arrange for a visit to this country of the Red Army Chorus and other similar groups, at the same time suggesting the possibility of corresponding visits to the Soviet Union by American groups. It was proposed that there be instituted an exchange of ballet groups, theater groups, and orchestras, and that reciprocal exhibits of art, architecture, and handicraft be arranged as a means of increasing the mutual understanding of the Soviet and American people.

During the next year or so, there were a number of offers either to visit Russia or to welcome Russians to the United States made by various interested American private groups and individuals, who hoped to establish cultural interchange with the Soviet Union. Texas, Columbia, and Amherst, among other educational institutions, endeavored to offer tuition fellowships to Soviet students. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton, and others, expressed their desire to exchange scientific personnel. The members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra offered to travel to the Soviet Union for 2 weeks at their own expense to give a series of performances, the proceeds to be used for whatever benefits the Soviet Government might select. Most of these offers, and there were many more, were never even acknowledged, and nothing materialized from any of them.

At least, the Ballet Theatre got an answer within the last few days to an earlier offer to

send a company of our outstanding dancers to Russia at no expense to the Soviet Union. The offer was rejected in terms which might have been a paraphrase of Mr. Belvedere's expressions of self-esteem:

"We are sure that it would be highly beneficial for the American ballet dancers to acquaint themselves with the achievement of the ballet in our country, which has stepped up to a new higher level of perfection during the days of the Soviet power."

In late 1946, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service invited four prominent Soviet doctors, including the eminent Dr. Parin, then Secretary General of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, to inspect American hospitals and our main cancer research centers. All the latest scientific developments were shown the group during its visit. But this was clearly not in line with Soviet policy. Upon his return to Moscow, Dr. Parin apparently disappeared, and shortly thereafter, the Soviet Minister of Health was dismissed. In December 1947, the iron curtain was formally recognized by a decree legally prohibiting Soviet cultural, scientific, and educational institutions from dealing directly with foreigners, thus reducing the very small area of informal contacts which had existed.

It does not appear to be enough to restrict contact merely on the grounds of wasted effort, although this point of view has been frequently stated. For example, a statement by K. Malkhov, a Stalin auto plant engineer, was recently published in Russia, after a trip to the United States, "I became convinced we Soviet specialists have nothing to learn from Americans." Western organizations are regarded as threats. Thus, Professor Bernstein, a Soviet professor, denounced the private American organization, the Institute of International Education, which had endeavored to arrange for an interchange, as a "monopoly

¹ Address made at the commencement exercises of Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., on June 12, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

American institution for training legal 'pedagogic' spies and informers, and for establishing an 'American column' in every country."

Even an interest in Western ideas has now become unpatriotic and disgraceful. While the iron curtain operates as a bar to actual contact with the outside world, it is supported by continual efforts to denounce foreign concepts and notions. In *Pravda* March 3, 1948, A. A. Zhdanov, the Soviet Minister of High Education, warned Soviet scientists against thinking about the possibility of scientific collaboration with foreign colleagues inasmuch as science cannot be divorced from politics. Better known is the decree of February 10, 1948, laying down the policy that Soviet music must be nationalistic, calling upon the composers to end forever all ties with "bourgeois" ideology in art. The prescriptions for the performance of architects also announce the superiority of Soviet architecture, which reflects "the Stalinist principle of solicitude for man" rather than "the ugly, misanthropic essence of the capitalist system." Says one of the leading Soviet architects, G. Seminov, "The architecture of foreign skyscrapers represses man, does not take account of him, of his interests and his demands." Perhaps the highest propaganda point in this field has been reached by the announcement that Russian architects, who have built no skyscrapers as yet, will construct buildings which will be completely rigid and immovable, typifying the might and planned character of the socialist national economy, and not structures like the Empire State Building which sway dangerously with every breeze, typifying the instability of the capitalist world. Art and literature likewise must protect themselves from foreign influences, feeding entirely upon internal sources and meeting criteria established by political authorities.

Along with the barriers against the inflow of ideas and information, there seems to be a reduction in intellectual traffic within the area. The First Five-Year Plan effective in 1929 was published in four volumes; the Second in two; the Third in one volume of 239 pages; and the Fourth, for 1945-50, in six pages in *Pravda*. In June 1947, the Soviets established probably the most extensive list of "state secrets" that any country has ever established. It so classified military and scientific information, and information concerning industry, agriculture, finance, trade, and transport. The decree ended with an omnibus clause covering "other information which the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. decides should not be divulged." The clause on scientific information classifies as secret:

"The discoveries, inventions, technical improvements, research and experimental work in all branches of science, technology and national economy until they have been finally completed and permission to publish them has been given."

Penalties for disclosing such secrets are now from 4 to 20 years in corrective labor camps. Even the United Nations has great difficulty in getting the simplest statistics from Russia, with the result that its bulletins contain the phrase over and over again, "world total excluding U.S.S.R."

In the past, Russia has had periods when the curtains have been drawn, for example, when Czar Nicholas I feared the possible spread of the Western European revolutionary movement of 1848. On the other hand, Peter the Great traveled incognito to other countries for the very purpose of finding new ideas and new methods. Between the wars, there were numerous Russian visitors to the United States to learn modern technology, although the purges of the middle thirties appear to have been directed in part at Russians who had been too friendly with foreign persons or ideas. During this interwar period, a number of American engineers worked on projects in Russia, including such major efforts as the Dnieperstroy Dam. During the war period and immediately thereafter, American industry opened wide its doors to Soviet engineers, technicians, and scholars. This was a one-way street, and few Americans ever visited Russian plants although there were hundreds of Russian visitors who, at the time, talked and behaved as though they did have something to learn from Americans. However, today, the curtain is all pervasive. It ranges from jamming the air waves and censoring the reporting of foreign correspondents to barring the gates to foreign visitors and denouncing as degenerate all foreign ideas.

I need not take time to describe our own country. We all recognize that the United States has been built with foreign material. True, there are many residues still surviving from the Indians, among them a collection of troublesome polysyllabic geographic names, some unusual designs and patterns, and some good literary and football material. However, on the whole, we owe far more to European civilization. We have attracted and absorbed immigrants, skills and technology, equipment and capital, and ideas from many other countries, and we continually acknowledge that indebtedness.

Still unformed and without social rigidities at the time of the Social and Industrial Revolution, it was easy for the American society to develop on the basis of freedom and ready access. We did not have a social structure which had acquired social habits and institutions over the previous centuries, based on different concepts and a different state of knowledge, largely tied to the maintenance of the *status quo*. We could adopt more easily the new concept of individual freedom. Ideas were free to compete in public, and free discussion has long been one of our great national pastimes.

We have of course contributed our own share to the course of American progress. But our railroads were built in large part by foreign capital

and immigrant labor. Our basic concepts of law and government trace back to foreign sources. And even in the twentieth century, our own great research laboratories and scientific studies have utilized and added to many major discoveries made in other lands. Foreign artists, foreign musicians, foreign authors, and foreign motion pictures are all familiar elements in our cultural life. And only a few ignoramuses—using the word with the full overtones of the original Latin—ever say “This is bad because it is foreign.”

To be sure, we are far from the achievement of the ideal of free circulation. We have established limits for immigration although the new displaced-persons legislation helps; we have our share of regional prejudices and biases; we have shameful evidences of class and racial discrimination; even the problem of setting certain boundaries to free discussion still raises issues to add to the record of divided opinions on the part of the already harassed Supreme Court. But the fact remains that our progress, such as it is, has been possible in very large part because of the wide acceptance of the notion of the intellectual and economic open door and resultant cumulative interplay of many contributing sources, domestic and foreign.

It is not my purpose to analyze or explain these two currently contrasting situations and their possible significance in the world today. I have painted these two quick and incomplete sketches merely to point out to each of you in the most graphic way I can imagine, the challenge of your own future. Individuals have the same choices as nations. You can be a closed system within an iron curtain, or you can be an open system constantly absorbing new facts and ideas from outside sources.

The primary purpose of a liberal arts college like Amherst is to get rid of iron curtains,—to develop the habit and practice of the open mind. It is said that, at the first meeting of a class of graduate students in economic theory in Cornell, before the professor had learned to distinguish one student from another by name, one man out of the mass asked a particularly penetrating question, and Professor Davenport replied, “As to the question asked by the gentleman from Amherst . . .” I don’t know whether he guessed that it was an Amherst man because of the courage required to ask the first question, or because of its originality. But I submit that such an incident, even if apocryphal indicates a wonderful reputation for a college and for Amherst men to have.

The possession of an open mind does not mean merely that you will seek out exposure to new facts and ideas. This process is of value only if you proceed to apply the intellectual process, testing new ideas against your own firm convictions, so that you actually grow in understanding rather than bewilderment. The open mind must be active, not passive. It must challenge and be eager

to be challenged. It must be skeptical yet continually seeking to be convinced.

There are many ways of describing the behavior of an open and trained mind, the educated mind, at work. First, it has an insatiable thirst for evidence. It wishes facts, more facts, and more facts. And it will never select arbitrarily the particular facts to be used to assure its arrival at some desired conclusion. The trained mind recognizes that the conclusion must encompass all the evidence, applying a coefficient of reliability, of course.

One of my most disappointing experiences in international conferring began last November at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris when the Foreign Minister of an Eastern European country charged the United States with refusing to grant licenses required to export certain items into his country. He specifically listed cotton linters, synthetic resins, ball bearings, radio tubes, knitting needles, apparatus for measurement, and phonograph discs, indicating that these were all completely barred from trade. I immediately cabled to Washington and got the facts in each case, and made a speech discussing each item in detail. I shall not repeat the speech, but as a quick summary, it proved to be the fact that with respect to certain items, cotton linters and phonograph discs, all applications for licenses had been granted. With respect to other items, such as synthetic resins, ball bearings, radio tubes, and apparatus for measurement, licenses had been granted for substantial amounts, often more than the prewar quantities. In the case of radio tubes, for example, licenses had been approved in a ratio of 68 approved to 1 rejected, measured in value terms. In the case of knitting needles, there had been a tremendous overshipment in March 1948, which brought the total far in excess of prewar shipments and of license authorizations as of that time, but I reported that the matter had since been cleared up, and that pending applications were being validated. In February, at Lake Success, at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council, the delegate from the same country made exactly the same charges and cited exactly and completely the same list of items. My statements as to the facts might just as well never have been made. Here was a complete iron curtain as to testimony and evidence. The open mind, on the contrary, is not merely in search of new evidence, but is prepared to proceed to strengthen or reconstruct earlier conclusions with every bit of new material available.

Second, the educated mind is continually aware of and reexamining the assumptions with which it works. It always seemed to me that one of the great values of mathematics is the conspicuous nature of its assumptions and definitions. Thus, we can say that three plus three are six in a system of numbers based on ten, but if we had had only two fingers on each hand and had built up a system

of numbers based on four, three plus three would truly be twelve. In the economic, political, and social fields, we have our assumptions and our definitions, and we need to be fully aware of them. Here is where we are likely to carry over prejudice and bias from our parents or our social group. For example, too many people base their judgment concerning acts of Congress on some simple assumption such as that Congress is controlled and directed by Wall Street, or by the labor unions, or by some religious group, or by some small group of descendants of the 1933 migration to Washington. The Communists, of course, lay all its actions to the "monopolists," whoever they may be. Any of these assumptions is not only untrue, but it is likewise dangerous as providing a basis for interpreting our political processes.

Third, the educated mind, given its facts and its assumptions, seeks internal consistency. This is the area of logic. One persistent enemy of the reasoning process is the person who draws a grand conclusion because, "I knew a case once when . . ." thus demonstrating a generalization by a particular. Here also is the area where honesty is particularly important. Prejudice, bias, or even ulterior motive all try to twist the results. I once prepared a detailed study for a State Commission based on extensive field-work. The laboriously gathered facts led, it seemed to me, to an obvious and inevitable conclusion. The report was published, but the State Commission drew the opposite conclusion and made the opposite recommendation to the legislature. It is not an unrelated fact that there were more voters with a financial interest on the side taken by the Commission.

The educated mind therefore is actively searching for the truth by demanding evidence, recognizing assumptions, and striving to derive an honest and consistent conclusion. This process inevitably suggests that the educated mind, because of its awareness of the limitations on certainty, will tend to be hesitant and ineffective. This is the dilemma of those who make use of the intellectual process. From the viewpoint of society, it is a very real danger, because the iron curtain operator has no such difficulty. He is sure and certain, even to the point of fanaticism. If you do desire to keep the iron curtains up, you must be determined and ready to reach conclusions for action, even if only tentative, at any given moment of time. The closed mind has no need for choice. The open mind must be able and willing to choose, to select, to evaluate, and to act accordingly. The intellectual process is not designed to stop all action, but rather to assure that the course will be followed at any moment of time whose wisdom seems clearest in terms of the illumination then available.

It is of course much simpler to live with the curtains drawn, or riveted about one's self. By carefully spending your time with people of the same opinion as yours, by avoiding all controver-

sial reading or lectures, by keeping the conversation on safe subjects such as golf, beverages, operations, and personal misdemeanors, or otherwise excusing yourself from the group, you can easily prevent any light from reaching you. You will never be disturbed or your conclusions challenged by new facts or new ideas. You will never have the embarrassing problem of admitting that you may have been in error at some time in the past. You can participate on all subjects with easy authority. If this is your goal, then probably it is easiest to achieve if you arrange to be put in solitary confinement, although many individuals have actually succeeded in achieving this state of being an intellectual zombie, while walking about apparently alive.

Being static and closed is easy and simple, but stupid and dull. If Amherst has been at all successful in facilitating your education, then the curtains have been raised, and you have some notion of the excitement and stimulation of life in these days, if one's mind is open. And you probably also know that this life is not without danger. My wife was in a group of ladies the other day when one of them expressed curiosity as to how Russia got along without money. My wife explained that Russians did have money in the form of rubles as well as considerable freedom of expenditure. The questioner looked most horrified and said, "I never heard of such a thing. M-m-m—are you a Communist?" Open minds are always in danger among closed minds, but at least they are alive.

The problem of the iron curtain versus the open mind will always exist. You will have to take sides. It is not merely a problem as to your personal life. For the United States, we must continually struggle to protect the channels along which facts and ideas flow. Freedom of information and freedom of discussion are great bases underlying our social and political structure, but they must be guarded carefully. And classes and groups are continually trying to impose their particular interests and biases on the whole. The only protection is for a strong national insistence on the right to maintain open opinions openly arrived at. Nor is it merely our national problem. In the world today, there are great areas where no clear stand has yet been taken. Narrow nationalism threatens to draw curtains of one sort or another. Yet it is obvious that understanding and good-will can come only from the freest interchange of persons and ideas.

The motto of Amherst, *Terras irradiant*, places our alma mater clearly in the van of those who believe in the importance of light, ever resistant to curtains about the mind. Amherst must live through her sons, as she has lived through generation after generation of Amherst men. Rays of light are pictured on the Amherst seal. They must shine also through you, her youngest sons.

Perpetual Peace Through World-Wide Federation

BY GEORGE V. ALLEN¹

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

A century and a half ago the world was stirred by two great revolutions, the first one in the United States and the second in France. Inspired by these two movements, a wise philosopher in eastern Europe, Immanuel Kant of Königsberg, expressed the belief that a federation of free peoples would some day bring about lasting peace.

Kant was aware that people who lived under absolute monarchs or dictators were not the stuff out of which a successful world federation could be built.

A half century later, Alfred Lord Tennyson dipped even farther into the future and envisioned the "Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World." Tennyson had in mind a representative parliament, elected by free people living under democratic institutions.

For the first hundred and fifty years of our existence, we Americans were not greatly concerned with the question of democracy. We took it for granted at home and felt comfortably certain that democracy was gradually but steadily winning throughout the world. All we needed to do, apparently, was to attend to our own affairs and watch democratic institutions cover the earth.

Woodrow Wilson thought at Versailles that a sufficient degree of democracy had been achieved in the world to make possible the establishment of the "federation of free states," to which Immanuel Kant had referred. He thought the world had been made safe for democracy.

The tragedy of Woodrow Wilson was that he lived before his time, before democracy had spread sufficiently to make his great ideal workable.

In my opinion, the League of Nations was not killed by the failure of the United States to join it. As a democracy, we abided by the principles and edicts of the League more closely than some of the powers which assumed formally the obligations of the Covenant.

The League of Nations expired because democracy was crushed in Germany and because a totalitarian regime controlled the Soviet Union. The League was doomed to failure because it was not a federation of free peoples.

The question everyone asks today is whether the United Nations will be destroyed. I hope fervently that it will not. I hope that history does not repeat itself. But we who believe in this great world organization and who are working and

praying for its success are apprehensive.

As General Marshall said at the opening of the General Assembly in Paris last September, any government which disregards the rights of its own people is not likely to respect the rights of others. Aggression, if it comes, will destroy the United Nations as surely as it destroyed the League. And in totalitarianism, of either the right or the left, lie the seeds of aggressive action.

No true democracy can be either imperialistic or aggressive. The North Atlantic pact will remain a peace pact as long as its members adhere to democratic principles—as long as their governments are responsive to the will of their people.

We should begin to be concerned about the pact, just as we are now concerned about the United Nations, if any of the North Atlantic states should fall under the sway of either a Fascist or a Communist regime. The pact itself is our best safeguard against such an eventuality since its existence does much to free its members from the fear of aggression. Without it, the people of Western Europe might be driven, through fear, to extremist experiments. The pact has done much to achieve for its signers the fourth freedom—freedom from fear.

The Soviet Government uses the fear technique as a calculated instrument both in its internal relations with the Russian people and in the conduct of its foreign relations. Threats of personal violence against an individual or his family is a well-known Soviet method. Two years ago, when the Soviet Union was using every means in its power to force an oil concession from Iran, the Iranian Prime Minister was warned by high Soviet authority on two occasions that it would be very dangerous not only for Iran as a nation but for him personally if he did not grant the concession. Iran and other nations today remain in constant fear of an attack from a powerful neighbor.

Let us face the facts squarely and honestly. The United Nations, with all its virtues, has not yet been able to achieve freedom from fear. The reason is easy to understand. Its second most powerful member is not a democracy. The Russian people are not free.

¹ Made before the Institute of International Affairs at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, June 10, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

I should make it clear that while people must be free before they can cooperate successfully, I do not think they must necessarily follow the same economic pattern. If people are allowed entire freedom of choice, they will adopt the economic measures which serve them best and discard those which fail. The essential requirement for membership in a successful world federation is not, for example, whether a people have adopted or rejected a "cradle to grave" social security system. The requirement is that their economic experiments, of whatever kind, be freely adopted, after open public debate, without censorship or control of opinion, and can be as freely discarded whenever they do not serve the public interests.

I do not believe we shall have to wait another hundred and fifty years until the perpetual peace to which Kant referred is achieved through a world-wide federation of free peoples. Democracy has achieved a temporary set-back during the past generation, but it will resume its march of progress. Perhaps the very social upheavals of the past 30 years have done much to prepare the ground for a further significant advance in Eastern Europe and Asia. At least, the unholy alliance of decadent aristocracy and reactionary clericalism have been wiped away in areas where they formerly flourished.

I view the future with optimism. But at the same time, I am confident that a successful world federation will not be achieved until governments responsible to the will of the people are established in all of the major countries of the globe.

Many sincere and enthusiastic internationalists in the United States have shown impatience with the Government in Washington for not moving faster along the road to world federation or world government. Some of these enthusiasts believe that the Western democracies are too tenacious in holding on to their national sovereignty, too reluctant to grant sufficient power to an international body to make it strong enough to survive. A few such people, particularly among the young intellectual group, succumb to the Soviet propaganda line that the Western powers are reactionary in their nationalism, with no forward-looking program aimed at eventual world federation. In their impatience and irritation, some of these people even go over to the Soviet side, in the belief that the program of the Kremlin offers the best opportunity for reducing nationalistic barriers to international cooperation.

Such reasoning is utterly fallacious. The democracies are working to achieve an international organization based on the only principles which offer any chance of success. World conquest can never be the basis for lasting world federation, no matter whether the conquest is by a cruel or by an enlightened despot, by a military genius like Alexander or Napoleon, or even by an army spurred on by religious or ideological fervor.

Efforts along this line have often been made in the past and have always failed, as they always will fail. The key to world federation is freedom, not slavery; democracy not tyranny; and cooperation, not conquest. Immanuel Kant saw this fact clearly a hundred and fifty years ago, but some of our most brilliant professors can't see it yet.

The Kremlin does not understand the meaning of the word cooperation. Either it must dominate or it refuses to play on the team.

Your significant conference on the Middle East, held here in the Middle West, will consider an area of the world in which I have had the privilege of serving for a number of years. I would like to speak for a few minutes concerning one important aspect of the ideological struggle which we Americans must keep constantly in mind in studying that area.

The most effective Soviet propaganda line in the Middle East, or in any other area where there are large numbers of poor or oppressed people, is to repeat, *ad nauseam*, that the United States has nothing to offer but a program of reaction. Radio Moscow and its parrots in countries like Iran and the Arab States din continually into the receptive ears of landless peasants that the United States is on the side of the absentee landlords, the feudal barons, and the medieval clergy.

We must make it clear, by every means in our power, that we have something better to offer than merely opposition to change. It is true that we oppose a change to Communism in the Middle East, with its oppression more heavy than any landlord or pasha, its bigotry more ferocious than any mullah.

But we are anxious to bring about a change for the better in that area. We want to see the standard of living raised ten times above its present level. We want to see the scourges of malaria, trachoma, and other diseases eliminated.

We want every individual to have a chance to earn a decent livelihood, to educate his children, and to develop his capacities. Our program looks forward, not backward. Positive proof of this is contained in the statement of President Truman, in his inaugural address, announcing a bold new program of technical assistance to underdeveloped areas.

This program is based on the policy of the good neighbor. We want to help the countries of the Middle East to be strong and independent, economically and politically, just as we have helped and are helping the countries of the Western Hemisphere in this direction.

A successful implementation of this program will provide the answer to the frequently expressed complaint that the United States has had no positive policy in the Middle East. This implementation will take time, but the possibilities are unlimited.

Marshall Islands Scrap Material To Be Sold

[Released to the press June 6]

The Department of State announced on June 6 that the final offering of any significant amount of surplus by its Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner resulted in a high bid of \$31,000 for an estimated 94,000 tons of ferrous, nonferrous, and other scrap materials located throughout the Marshall Islands.

This material, located on the islands of Kwajalein, Ebeye, Roi, Namur, and Majuro, in the Marshall group, had originally been scheduled for transfer to China under terms of the China Bulk Sale Agreement of August 30, 1946, but by subsequent amendment title to the property was returned to the United States at China's request.

The initial public offering of this property, which was made on January 10, 1949, resulted in all bids being rejected as insufficient, the high bid being only \$6,400. On the reoffering made on March 28, 1949, the following bids were received: T. Carr, Sydney, Australia, \$31,000.00; Acorn Engineering Company, New York City, \$15,999.99; Double Bend Manufacturing Company, New York City, \$10,338.12; Elmer Perry, Los Angeles, California, \$210.00. The high bidder, T. Carr, of Sydney, Australia, having demonstrated financial responsibility and having posted a performance bond of \$50,000, received the award. The contract requires that all salable scrap, as a critical item, must be sold to buyers who agree to return it to the United States for use in the United States economy. The purchaser is also required by the contract to remove any and all residual scrap items from the islands to insure proper "policing up" of the areas where the scrap is now located.

The Foreign Liquidation Commissioner's office is scheduled to liquidate itself by June 30, 1949. Since its creation shortly before the end of the last war, it has disposed of approximately \$10,300,000,000 (at procurement cost), realizing approximately \$2,000,000,000 or about 20 percent from these sales.¹

The Flaxseed Scarcity Terminated

The President on May 31 signed a proclamation² declaring that the flaxseed-scarcity situation prevailing during the war and early postwar periods has terminated. The effect of the proclamation will be to restore the duty on flaxseed to the rate of 50 cents per bushel, negotiated in the reciprocal trade agreements signed with Argentina and Uruguay on October 14, 1941, and July 21, 1942, respectively. The 1930 Tariff Act rate was 65 cents per bushel. The agreements referred to carried a proviso to the effect that the normal rate would be 50 cents per bushel, but that until the

thirtieth day following a proclamation by the President of the United States, after consultation with the respective foreign governments, declaring that the then existing abnormal situation had terminated, a special rate of duty of 32½ cents per bushel would be collected on flaxseed imported into the United States.

As compared to the scarcity both of flaxseed and linseed oil existing at the time the agreements were negotiated, the United States now has a substantial surplus on hand from domestic production.

The 50 cent duty becomes effective on June 30, 1949.

Cuba Grants Renegotiation of Certain Tariff Concessions on Potatoes

At the third session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now being held at Annecy, France, Cuba has requested and the United States and Canada have agreed to the renegotiation of certain tariff concessions on potatoes granted by Cuba in Schedule IX (the Cuban schedule) of the General Agreement.

The Cubans have requested that the rate of duty on potatoes imported into Cuba in July be increased and has offered, in return, to decrease the rates of duty on potatoes imported in October and November. Cuba has requested that any duty changes which may be agreed upon be made effective July 1, 1949.

Views of any interested persons with regard to these renegotiations were submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, established to receive views on trade-agreement matters, before June 25, 1949. Such communications should be addressed to: The Secretary, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmation

On June 7, 1949, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Pete Jarman to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Australia.

Naval Attaché Appointed

Commander James T. Hodgson, Jr., USN, was appointed on June 6 the first Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air to the American Embassy at Colombo, Ceylon.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1949, p. 503.

² Proc. 2843, 14 Fed. Reg. 2913.

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Text of Convention
U.S.-U.K. Consular Convention
Recommendations of the West Indian Conference, Third Session
Calendar of International Meetings, with Annotations

Copies of the publication are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., at 30¢ a copy.

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